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DROPPING THE SPEAR: THE CASE FOR ENHANCED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRIOR TO CLASS CERTIFICATION  
Linda S. Mullenix  
After granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, 
therefore, and since (as was predictable, given the district judge’s 
ground) no one stepped forward to pick up the spear dropped by the 
named plaintiffs, the judge denied the motion for class certification.
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 Morris & Rita Atlas Chair in Advocacy, The University of Texas School of Law. The author 
wishes to thank the participants at the Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth of 
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2010 meeting of the AALS Section on Litigation (New Orleans). 
 1. Cowen v. Bank United, 70 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the swamp of summary judgment literature,
2
 academics,
3
 
commentators,
4
 treatise-writers,
5
 empiricists,
6
 and practitioners
7
 pay 
scant attention to the role of summary judgment in class action litigation, 
prior to class certification.
8
  This lacuna is perhaps justified by the 
 
 2. There is a sizeable body of summary judgment scholarship; much of it generated after the 
Supreme Court‘s 1986 ―trilogy‖ of cases on summary judgment standards.  See infra note 10.  For a 
collection of academic and empirical scholarship relating to summary judgment prior to the Court‘s 
trilogy, see Joe Cecil, Rebecca N. Eyre, Dean Miletich, and David Rindskopf, A Quarter-Century of 
Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 861, 
865 n.10 (2007). 
 3. See, e.g., John Bronstein, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522 
(2007); Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: 
Drifting Towards Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591 (2004); Edward 
Brunet, Summary Judgment is Constitutional, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1625 (2008);  Martin H. Redish, 
Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 1329 (2005); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and 
Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705 (2007); Adam N. Steinman, An Ounce of 
Prevention: Solving Some Unforeseen Problems With the Proposed Amendments to Rule 56 and the 
Summary Judgment Practice, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 230 (2008); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary 
Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007). 
 4. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, The Story of Celotex: The Role of Summary Judgment in the 
Administration of Civil, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 343-70 (Kevin M. Clermont, ed. 2004); 
Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (1998). 
 5. EDWARD BRUNET & MARTIN H. REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND 
PRACTICE (3d ed. 2009). 
 6. See Joe Cecil and George Cort, Memorandum, Report on Summary Judgment Practice 
Across Districts with Variations in Local Rules (Federal Judicial Center, Aug. 13, 2009); Joe Cecil 
and George Cort, Memorandum, Supplemental Analyses of Summary Judgment Local Rules 
Practices (Federal Judicial Center May 30, 2009); Joe Cecil and George Cort, Memorandum,  
Report on Summary Judgment Practice Across Districts with Variations in Local Rules (Federal 
Judicial Center April 2, 2008); Cecil, Eyre, & Miletich, supra note 2, at 861.; Joe S. Cecil, Rebecca 
N. Eyre, Dean Miletich, and David Rindskopf, Trends in Summary Judgment Practice: 1975-2000 
(Federal Judicial Center 2007); Joe Cecil and George Cort, Memorandum, Estimates of Summary 
Judgment Activity in Fiscal Year 2006 (Federal Judicial Center June 15, 2007); and Joe Cecil and 
George Cort, Memorandum, Initial Report on Summary Judgment Practice Across Districts with 
Variations in Local Rules (Federal Judicial Center Nov. 2, 2007). 
 7. See, e.g., Georgene M. Vairo, Through the Prism: Summary Judgment After the Trilogy, 
American Law Institute-American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education ALI-ABA Course 
of Study (July 2007). 
 8. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1) (directing courts to determine at ―an early practicable time‖ 
whether a proposed class action may be maintained as a class action.  See also MANUAL FOR 
COMPLEX LITIGATION FOURTH at § 21.133 (Federal Judicial Center 2004) (timing of the 
certification decision and pre-certification threshold dispositive motions); Thomas E. Willging, 
Laural L. Hooper & Robert J. Niemic, Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four Federal District 
Courts: Final Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 29-33 (Federal Judicial Center 
2
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corresponding scant attention paid by courts―in reported decisions, at 
least
9―to summary judgment prior to class certification.  This is 
unfortunate. 
This brief article makes the case for enhanced judicial scrutiny of 
summary judgment motions prior to the class certification decision.  
This argument is congruent (and convergent) with the Supreme Court‘s 
summary judgment trilogy,
10
 the Court‘s twin pleading decisions in 
Twombly
11
 and Iqbal,
12
 the Third Circuit‘s decision in Hydrogen 
Peroxide,
13
 and the suggestions from various quarters that courts ought 
 
1996) (rate of pre-certification rulings on motions to dismiss was approximately 80 percent in three 
of four districts studied and about 60 percent in other districts; approximately three out of ten cases 
were terminated as a result of a summary judgment motion).  The findings of this study are 
discussed at greater length, infra note 22. 
It is, of course, possible to move for summary judgment after class certification, and many of 
the reported decisions dealing with summary judgment and class actions occur in this posture.  This 
article does not address the issues relating to summary judgment after class certification.  See 
discussion infra Part I, concerning the strategic decision to seek summary judgment prior to or after 
class certification. 
 9. As Professor Stephen Burbank correctly points out—a view this author completely 
endorses―it is inherently misleading to venture broad theories about summary judgment practice 
based on reported courts decisions, because reported decisions do not provide a reliable means for 
assessing actual summary judgment practice in the courts.  See Burbank, supra note 3, at 604.  See 
also Cecil, Eyre, & Miletich, A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice, supra note 2, at 
869-67 (commenting on the same problems of empirical research concerning summary judgment 
based on reported decisions, and surveying problematic studies).  See infra notes 54-62 (citing cases 
in which courts have granted pre-certification summary judgment motions, and reasons in support 
of summary judgment practice before ruling on the class certification motion). 
 10. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (clarifying the shifting allocations of 
burdens of production, persuasion, and proof at summary judgment); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-56 (1986) (applying heightened evidentiary standard of proof in libel action 
to judicial assessment of propriety of summary judgment); Matshushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (holding antitrust plaintiff with an inherently implausible claim 
was subject to dismissal at summary judgment).  For assessments of the summary judgment trilogy, 
see Marcy J. Levine, Comment, Summary Judgment: The Majority View Undergoes a Complete 
Reversal in the 1996 Supreme Court, 37 EMORY L. J. 171 (1988); John E. Kennedy, Federal 
Summary Judgment: Reconciling Celotex v. Catrett with Adickes v. Kress and Evidentiary 
Problems Under Rule 56, 6 REV. OF LITIG. 227 (1987). 
 11. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).  See generally Robert G. Bone, 
Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873 (2009); 
Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063 (2009); Kendall W. Hannon, 
Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study of the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on Rule 
12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811 (2008); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility 
Pleading, 49 B.C.L. REV. 431 (2008). 
 12. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 13. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307-09 (3d Cir. 2008) (clarifying 
the requirements of the ―rigorous analysis‖ standard for class certification; requiring that class 
proponents prove class certification requirements by a preponderance of the evidence and that 
courts resolve all disputed issues of fact in order to certify a class).  The Third Circuit‘s Hydrogen 
Peroxide decision joins a series of similar appellate decisions requiring heightened certification 
3
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to evaluate the merits of proposed class actions during the class 
certification process.
14
  Summary judgment prior to class certification, 
then, is a logical―and desirable―extension of these trends. 
This article argues that summary judgment before class certification 
embodies a sensible timing accommodation between the heightened 
pleading requirements of Twombly/Iqbal and the heightened class 
certification requirements of Hydrogen Peroxide.  The argument for a 
summary judgment determination prior to class certification is based on 
the fact that class certification changes the litigation dynamic, being 
disconnected from the underlying merits of the dispute.  The argument 
for summary judgment prior to class certification is based on the simple 
premise that if an individual plaintiff‘s case is so fatally defective 
(factually and legally) even after discovery, then the court ought to end 
the case and not permit class certification to proceed.  The argument for 
 
requirements and merits-determinations at class certification.  See also Oscar Private Equity Inv. v. 
Allegiance Telecomm., Inc., 487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007); In re Public Offering Sec. Litig., 471 
F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006); Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356 94th Cir. 2004); Szabo v. 
Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001).  For commentary on these appellate cases 
as embodying a trend that is ―chipping away‖ at the Eisen rule, see generally Steig D. Olson, 
“Chipping Away”: The Misguided Trend Towards Resolving Merit Disputes as Part of the Class 
Certification Calculus, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 935 (2009). 
 14. See Robert G. Bone and David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 
51 DUKE L.J. 1251 (2002) (urging abolition of the so-called ―Eisen rule‖); Roy Alan Cohen and 
Thomas J. Coffey, Judicial Review of Class Certification Applications ― The Compelling Case for 
a Merits-Based Gate-Keeper Analysis, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 257 (April 2009) (stating that the Second 
Circuit‘s decision in Miles v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 471 F.3d 24, 32-33 (2d Cir. 2006) provides 
guide for courts to address role of merits in class certification); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Class 
Certification Based on Merits of the Claims, 69 TENN. L. REV. 1 (2001) (arguing that consideration 
should be given to procedures for determining the merits of the individual claims and the size of the 
class before a suit is certified as a class suit); Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the 
Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849 (2004) 
(arguing in favor of a merits assessment of claims prior to judicial approval of a proposed class 
action settlement); Bartlett H. McGuire, The Death Knell for Eisen: Why the Class Action Analysis 
Should Include an Assessment of the Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366 (1966) (proposing an amendment to 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) to provide for an assessment of the merits, to be included as part of the 
superiority analysis of class action treatment); Geoffrey P. Miller,  Review of the Merits of Class 
Action Certification, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 51 (2004) (arguing in favor of ―weak-form‖ rules to 
permit reasonable inquiries into the merits as relevant to class certification); and Douglas M. 
Towns, Note, Merit-Based Class Action Certification: Old Wine in a New Bottle, 78 VA. L. REV. 
1001 (1992).  But cf. Olson, supra note 13, at 939: 
It appears that courts driving this trend, and the commentators who encourage them, are 
motivated less by concerns of judicial efficiency, doctrinal coherence, or deterrence 
goals, and more by a desire to use Rule 23 to screen what are perceived to be weak cases 
from strong ones.  The notion that Rule 23 should involve screening cases based on 
merit is a product of a belief that corporate defendants need judicial shielding from the 
coercive effect the certification decision can have on a defendant.  That coercion is seen 
as unfair when class claims are weak. 
4
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summary judgment prior to class certification is based on efficiency and 
fairness rationales; summary adjudication before class certification 
supports the goals of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 to secure the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of all civil actions.  This is 
especially compelling when confronted with a legally and factually 
deficient complex litigation. 
This proposal for pre-certification summary judgment adjudication 
does not violate the so-called Eisen rule.
15
  It has nothing to do with the 
Eisen rule, because the Eisen rule only comes into play at the point at 
which a judge must evaluate whether to certify a proposed class action.  
Pre-certification evaluation of a summary judgment motion effectively 
avoids the Eisen rule by forcing a merits determination prior to class 
certification, in an individual case setting.  If an individual plaintiff has a 
viable claim, pre-certification summary judgment adjudication will not 
undermine the possibility for class litigation.  On the contrary, if a 
plaintiff has a fatally defective case after summary judgment discovery, 
then courts ought not to sanction a plaintiff‘s advantage achieved 
through class certification of an aggregation of multiple bad claims.  
Moreover, if a plaintiff at summary judgment drops the spear of class 
litigation and no one else rises to champion the class, then the litigation 
ought to be at an end. 
Historically, federal reception to summary judgment practice has 
been characterized by two general trends.  From 1938 through the 
Supreme Court‘s 1986 trilogy, many federal judges viewed summary 
judgment as a disfavored motion.
16
  The Court‘s 1986 trilogy of 
summary judgment decisions ushered in the second modern era of 
summary judgment practice.
17
  Numerous commentators have suggested 
that the Court‘s 1986 trilogy, then, embodied a signal from the Supreme 
Court to federal judges to utilize summary judgment procedure more 
often as a means to respond to factually deficient cases.
18
 
Parallel to these trends, courts historically have manifested 
ambivalent views concerning the use of summary judgment in complex 
 
 15. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974). 
 16. See Cecil, Eyre, & Miletich, supra note 2, at 862 (―Prior to the Supreme Court‘s trilogy of 
decisions in 1986, summary judgment was viewed as an underused and somewhat awkward tool 
that invited judicial distrust.‖)  (citing authorities). 
 17. ―Common perceptions regarding summary judgment have undergone a remarkable 
transformation in the past two decades.‖  Id. 
 18. Id. (―The trilogy has been widely viewed as a turning point in the use of summary 
judgment, signaling a greater emphasis on summary judgment as a necessary means to respond to 
claims and defenses without sufficient factual support.‖). 
5
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litigation.
19
  Prior to 1986, federal courts generally held the view that 
summary judgment should be used sparingly in complex antitrust 
actions,
20
 and it was almost a boilerplate proposition that complex cases 
were not suitable for summary adjudication.  As is well-known, the 
Supreme Court substantially eroded this historical resistance to the use 
of summary judgment to resolve complex cases in its 1986 Matsushita 
decision.
21
 
Prevailing jurisprudence has long suggested that complex cases, by 
virtue of their complexity, are especially not suitable for summary 
adjudication.  This article argues that the case for summary judgment 
prior to class certification is based on the same proposition: that complex 
cases are especially suitable for summary disposition in an appropriate 
case.  Convergent with heightened pleading and rigorous class 
certification standards, a requirement for pre-certification summary 
judgment stands the boilerplate opposition to summary judgment in 
complex cases on its head.  Rather than endorsing an implicit 
presumption against summary judgment in complex classes, the 
argument for pre-certification summary judgment is based on the 
concept that complex litigation is especially suited for summary 
judgment consideration. 
Finally, the idea that judges ought to rule on summary judgment 
motions prior to class certification is not new, and indeed, has been 
urged as a possible Rule 23 amendment.  More than fifteen years ago, 
during the first phase of proposed amendments to Rule 23, proponents 
suggested that Rule 23 be amended to require judges to consider Rule 12 
and Rule 56 motions prior to class certification.
22
  These proposals did 
 
 19. See BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 5, at § 9.3. 
 20. Id.; see Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962). 
 21. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).  See Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 844 F.2d 473, 475 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (the 1986 trilogy makes ―clear that, contrary to the emphasis of some prior precedent, the 
use of summary judgment is not only permitted but encouraged in . . . antitrust cases.‖).  But cf. 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (reversing grant of summary 
judgment in antitrust illegal tying case; distinguishing Matsushita).  Brunet and Redish indicate that 
the erosion of resistance to the use of summary judgment in complex antitrust cases had been 
building among federal courts for some years prior to the Court‘s Matsushita decision.  See BRUNET 
& REDISH, supra note 5, at § 9.5.  For a lengthy analysis of the Matsushita decision, see id. at § 9.6. 
 22. See Willging, Hooper & Niemic, supra note 8, at Appendix A, Proposed Rule 23 – 1993, 
and Appendix B, Proposed Rule 23 – 1995.  The 1993 proposal would have amended Rule 
23(d)(1)(B) to state: 
[In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate 
orders that:] (B) decide a motion under Rule 12 or 56 before the certification 
determination if the court concludes that the decision will promote the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy and will not cause undue delay . . . . 
6
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not gain traction and were abandoned, along with an array of other 
proposals.  Moreover, the use of enhanced summary judgment prior to 
class certification also has received tacit endorsement from class action 
scholars at the Rand Institute for Civil Justice
23
 and support from 
researchers at the Federal Judicial Center.
24
 
Much has changed in the litigation landscape in the more than 
fifteen years since reformers first urged the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules to incorporate a provision that would provide explicit 
authority to federal judges to rule on summary judgment motions prior 
to class certification.  The desirability of such a provision now has 
considerable doctrinal and policy support―from the Supreme Court and 
federal appellate courts―embodied in the general trends requiring 
heightened pleading in complex cases and rigorous analysis of class 
certification requirements.
25
 
 
Id. at 94.  The proposed Advisory Committee Note to this new provision provided: ―Subdivision (d).  
The former rule generated uncertainty concerning the appropriate order of proceeding when a 
motion addressed to the merits of claims or defenses is submitted prior to a decision on whether a 
class should be certified.  The revision provides the court with discretion to address a Rule 12 or 
Rule 56 motion in advance of a certification decision if this will promote the fair and efficient 
adjudication of a controversy.  See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, SECOND, § 30.11.‖  Id. at 
98.  This proposed addition to Rule with regard to Rule 12 and 56 motions was carried forward to 
the proposed 1995 amendments.  The 1995 amendments also added provisions permitting the judge 
to assess the merits of claims and defenses at the time of class certification.  Id. at 101-02. 
 23. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER, BONNIE DOMBEY-MOORE, BETH GIDDENS, JENNIFER GROSS, 
ERIK K. MOLLER, AND NICHOLAS M. PACE, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS 
FOR PRIVATE GAIN at 26 (Rand Institute for Civil Justice Monograph 1999): 
Judge presiding over class actions should use their summary judgment and dismissal 
powers, when appropriate – as many do now.  Preserving the line between certification 
based on the form of the litigation (e.g., numerosity, commonality, superiority) and 
dismissal and summary judgment based on the substantive law and facts seems likely to 
produce consistent signals to parties as to what types of cases will be certified than 
conflating the two decisions. 
See also Deborah R. Hensler and Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond “It Just Ain’t Worth It:” Alternative 
Strategies for Damage Class Action Reform at 142 n.13 (Rand Institute for Civil Justice 2001) 
(―Under existing rules judge can, of course, dismiss class actions for failure to state a claim or by 
summary judgment.‖). 
 24. In commenting on the proposed 1993 and 1995 amendments to Rule 23, see supra note 
22, the authors of the empirical study of four federal district courts noted: ―Having explicit authority 
to so rule, however, might influence any judge who has felt constrained to avoid ruling on such 
motions prior to class certification.‖  See Willging, Hooper & Neiemic, supra note 8, at 29. 
 25. See supra notes 10 and 13. 
7
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II.  SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRIOR TO CLASS CERTIFICATION: STRATEGY 
AND BASIC PRINCIPLES 
A. Empirical Studies of Summary Judgment Prior to Class 
Certification 
We do not know a great deal about summary judgment prior to 
class certification, and what we do know consists of somewhat dated 
empirical data.
26
  Although the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) has 
conducted numerous empirical studies of summary judgment practice in 
federal court in the post-trilogy era,
27
 these studies do not illuminate the 
use of summary judgment in complex litigation or the subset of class 
action cases.
28
  Rather, the FJC summary judgment studies collect data 
relating to trends in summary judgment filings (and dispositions) based 
on substantive categories of cases, such as contracts, civil rights, torts, 
and a catch-all ―other‖ category.29  What the FJC summary judgment 
studies do not inform is the percentage or rate of substantive cases 
pursued as class action litigation; moreover, the FJC summary judgment 
studies also do not address summary judgment disposition either prior to 
class certification or after class certification. 
The Federal Judicial Center has also conducted a number of studies 
of class action practice in federal courts.  Most recently, these studies 
have focused on the impact of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
(CAFA)
30
 on federal courts‘ diversity dockets.31  The first phase of the 
FJC‘s long-term CAFA study examined whether CAFA has resulted in 
increased original or removal class action filings in federal court.
32
  
―Phase II of the Center‘s CAFA impact study will address the nature and 
sources of underlying class claims; class discovery; remand rulings; pre-
trial motions practice; class certification activity; and the process of 
 
 26. The only Federal Judicial Center study to examine pre-certification dispositive motions is 
the Center‘s 1996 empirical study of class action practice in four judicial districts.  See Willging, 
Hooper & Neiemic, supra note 22. 
 27. See supra note 6. 
 28. For a discussion of the potential use of pre-certification dispositive motions in 
Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) practice, see infra pp. 52-54. 
 29. See, e.g., Cecil, Eyre, & Miletich, supra note 2. 
 30. Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). 
 31. See Thomas E. Willging and Emery G. Lee III, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005: Third Interim Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 2 
(Federal Judicial Center April 2007) (finding a 46 percent increase in class action activity from 
January to June 2006; also reporting an increase in diversity removal cases to federal courts). 
 32. Id. 
8
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reviewing settlements.‖33  Because this portion of the FJC impact project 
is not yet completed, there is no currently available data on federal court 
practice with regard to pre-certification dispositive motions. 
The only extant empirical study of federal pre-certification 
summary judgment motions, then, is the FJC‘s 1996 study of class 
action practice in four federal district courts (the Northern District of 
Illinois, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Northern District of 
California, and the Southern District of Florida).
34
  The study examined 
both pre-certification Rule 12 motions to dismiss, as well as Rule 56 
summary judgment motions, and many of the Center‘s conclusions are 
based on combined data for the two sets of motions.
35
 
With regard to all types of pre-certification motions, the 1996 FJC 
study concluded that approximately two out of three cases in each of the 
four district courts issued rulings on a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, a Rule 
56 motion for summary judgment, or a sua sponte dismissal order.
36
  Of 
the cases in which litigants filed a motion to dismiss, courts issued 
rulings in between 73 percent and 81 percent of the cases, depending on 
the district.
37
  Obviously, this high percentage of adjudication indicates 
that federal judges in these four districts were willing to issue rulings on 
dispositive motions, rather than deferring such rulings. 
With regard to the subset of Rule 56 motions, the FJC study 
documented that the vast majority of summary judgment motions were 
filed by defendants.
38
  Judges in two district courts issued rulings on 
summary judgment approximately 85 percent of the time, and judges in 
the other two districts issued rulings 60 percent of the time.
39
  Courts 
granted motions for summary judgment in whole or in part in more than 
half the rulings (54 percent to 68 percent) in three of the four districts.
40
  
In the fourth,
41
 summary judgment motions were granted in whole or in 
part 39 percent of the time.
42
 
 
 33. See Progress Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules on the Impact of CAFA on 
the Federal Courts 1 (Federal Judicial Center November 7, 2007). 
 34. Willging, Hooper & Neiemic, supra note 22. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 171, Table 24. 
 37. The FJC study found that this rate of ruling approximates the rate of rulings found in three 
studies of motions to dismiss in general litigation.  Id. at 33 n.104. 
 38. Id. at 33, n.105, 125 Figure 26, and 172 Table 26. 
 39. Id. at 33, n.106; 126 Figure 27.  The study notes, with regard to summary judgment 
motions: ―[the] data that are comparable to and, overall, somewhat higher than the rate of rulings in 
a study of general civil litigation.‖  Id. 
 40. Id. at 172, Table 26. 
 41. The FJC study considered the Northern District of Illinois somewhat of an anomaly in the 
study, because of the district court‘s jurisprudence disfavoring summary judgment motions in the 
9
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The FJC study also found that judges generally took a longer time 
to rule on motions for summary judgment than on other motions to 
dismiss.  The median time from the filing of the first motion for 
summary judgment to the first summary judgment ruling was less than 
four months in two courts, and more than seven months in the other two 
courts.
43
  Seventy-five percent of all motions for summary judgment 
were resolved in 7.9, 15.4, 16.8, and 5.2 months in the four courts.
44
 
In assessing its findings of data on combined Rule 12 and Rule 56 
motions to dismiss, the FJC broadly concluded: 
On the one hand, motions to dismiss are filed and granted more 
frequently in class action litigation than in ordinary civil litigation.  
Such data indicate that a relatively large number of cases are found to 
be without legal or factual merit, or both.  Comparison with data from 
a 1974 study of (b)(3) class actions indicates, however, that the rate of 
dismissal and summary judgment is lower in the current study than it 
was during the 1966-1972 in one federal district court. 
 On the other hand, defendants generally appear to have had an 
opportunity to test the merits of the litigation and obtain a judicial 
ruling in a reasonably timely manner, particularly for motions to 
dismiss.  Testing the factual sufficiency of claims via summary 
judgment, however, may take more than a year for some rulings in 
some courts. 
 For at least one-third of the cases in our study, judicial rulings on 
motions terminated the litigation without a settlement, coerced or 
otherwise.  The settlement value of other cases was undoubtedly 
influenced by rulings granting motions for partial dismissal or partial 
summary judgment and by rulings denying such motions.
45
 
The 1996 FJC findings are notable for several reasons.  First, the 
1996 FJC data may prove surprising to many class action practitioners, 
who anecdotally believe that judges are disinclined to rule on pre-
certification dispositive motions, preferring instead to defer such rulings 
until after class certification.  The FJC data seems to disprove that 
impressionistic belief. Second, the FJC data suggests that pre-
certification motion practice (including rulings on such motions) 
generally tracks the same incidence of dispositive motion practice as in 
 
class action context.  Nonetheless, the study concluded that even in light of this historical resistance 
to such summary judgment motions, district judges in the Northern District of Illinois did grant 
summary judgment dismissals in class action litigation. 
 42. Id. at 172, Table 26. 
 43. Id. at 173, Table 29. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 34. 
10
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ordinary litigation.  This finding may prove surprising to critics of 
summary judgment, who believe that federal judges excessively use 
dispositive motions to eliminate categories of cases based on the judge‘s 
subjective predilections.  The FJC findings seem to refute any theory or 
argument that judges utilize dispositive motions or summary judgment 
to excessively dismiss class action litigation. 
However, the 1996 FJC findings with regard to summary judgment 
practice in class action litigation must be cabined by the limitations of 
that study, as well as its timeliness.
46
  The FJC study examined pre-
certification motion practice in only four federal district courts,
47
 and at 
least one of the districts the FJC identified as an outlier with regard to its 
views on summary judgment.
48
  The database, then, was extremely 
limited.  In addition, the FJC data is now approximately fifteen years 
old.  In the interim, there has been a sea-change in pleading and motions 
practice, in both ordinary and complex federal class action litigation.  
Hence, Phase II of the FJC‘s CAFA impact study, which contemplates a 
new empirical study of dispositive motion practice, should provide 
important new data on trends in federal court against this changed 
litigation landscape.
49
 
B. Existing Jurisprudence on Pre-Certification Summary Judgment 
Practice 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 is silent concerning the timing 
of summary judgment motions in relation to class certification.
50
  
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 likewise makes no reference to 
summary judgment in the context of class action litigation.
51
  The 2003 
amendments to Rule 23 changed the language concerning the timing of 
class certification, instructing courts to make a class certification 
determination ―at an early practicable time.‖52  The Federal Judicial 
Center advises federal judges to feel free to ignore local rules calling for 
specific time limits relating to the class certification determination, but 
 
 46. Id. at 4-5. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 30. 
 49. See Progress Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules on the Impact of CAFA on 
the Federal Courts  1 (Federal Judicial Center November 7, 2007). 
 50. Id. at 94. 
 51. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 52. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1). 
11
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instead to apply the 2003 amended Rule 23(c)(1) certification timing 
provision.
53
 
Perhaps more importantly, the Federal Judicial Center now informs 
federal judges that in tandem with the 2003 amended timing provision, 
judges are permitted to rule on motions or to dismiss by summary 
judgment before ruling on class certification.
54
  Indeed, the FJC instructs 
that: 
Given the flexibility in the rules, the most efficient practice is to rule 
on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment before addressing 
class certification.  Ruling on class certification may prove to be 
unnecessary.  The most important actions you can take to promote 
settlement are to rule on dispositive motions and then, if necessary, 
rule on class certification.
55
 
The Federal Judicial Center‘s current position urging federal judges 
to rule on pre-certification dispositive motions diverges from the 
historical position of some federal courts―most notably the Seventh 
Circuit
56―that interpreted the Supreme Court‘s ruling in Eisen v. 
Carlisle & Jacqueline
57
 to require that courts rule on class certification 
before making any ruling on the merits of the case.
58
  This interpretation 
 
 53. See Barbara J. Rothstein, Managing Class Action Litigation: A Pocket Guide for Judges 
(Federal Judicial Center 2009) (―Considering this rule, you should feel free to ignore local rules 
calling for specific time limits; they appear to be inconsistent with the federal rules and, as such, 
obsolete‖) (citing the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH § 21.133).  The 1996 FJC 
empirical study of class action practice also examined the impact of local rules on the timing of 
dispositive and summary judgment motions, and generally concluded that it seemed doubtful that 
local rules had an effect on judge‘s rulings on pre-certification motions.  See Willging, et al., supra 
note 22, at 94. 
For commentary on the amendment to Rule 23(c)(1) and its effect on pre-certification 
dispositive motions, see BRUNET & REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT § 10:16 (3d ed. 2009); JOSEPH 
M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:1 (5th ed. 2009) (timing of class action 
determination – ―early practicable time‖ requirement). 
 54. Rothstein, supra note 53, at 8. 
 55. Id. at 8-9. 
 56. The Seventh Circuit has had a historical antipathy to granting summary judgment motions 
prior to class certification motions.  See, e.g., Koch v. Standard, 962 F.2d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 1992) 
and Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 868 F.2d 943, 947 (7th Cir. 1989).  In both these cases, the 
Seventh Circuit expressed its view that it is improper for a district court to delay ruling on a class 
certification motion until after having decided a motion to dismiss.  But cf. Cowen v. Bank United, 
70 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 1995) (allowing for district court discretion to decide summary judgment 
motions prior to class certification). 
 57. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
 58. See, e.g., Nance v. Union Carbide Corp., 540 F.2d 718, 723 n.9 (4th Cir. 1976) vacated, 
431 U.S. 952 (1977) (quoting Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp., 523 F.2d 349, 354 (7th Cir. 1975)).  See 
also Willging, Hooper & Neiemic, supra note 22, at 29, 94 (discussing the divergent views of 
federal courts regarding ruling on pre-certification dispositive motions). 
12
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of Eisen, in relation to the timing of dispositive motions, was predicated 
on avoiding one-way intervention or opt-out by class members who 
would know the outcome on the merits in advance of class 
certification.
59
  However, despite this theoretical Eisen doctrinal barrier, 
some other federal courts historically permitted courts to rule on pre-
certification dispositive motions, viewing such motions as a partial or 
complete waiver of the protection against one-way intervention.
60
 
Whatever may have been the historical disinclination of some 
federal courts to eschew ruling on pre-certification dispositive motions, 
it now seems well-established that federal courts not only have the 
authority to rule on dispositive motions prior to class certification,
61
 but 
 
 59. Hudson v. Chicago Teachers‘ Union, 922 F.2d 1306, 1317 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 
U.S. 1230 (1991); Peritz, 523 F.2d at 353-54; Issen v. GSC Enter., Inc., 522 F. Supp. 390, 395 
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (discussing one-way intervention problem). 
 60. See, e.g., Wright v. Schock, 742 F.2d 541, 544 (9th Cir. 1984) (implicit waiver where the 
defendant assumes the risk of the limited effect of its summary judgment motion); Peritz 523 F.2d 
at 354 n.4 (noting that defendants may waive one-way intervention protection by moving for 
summary judgment prior to class certification); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 762 (3d 
Cir. 1974) (en banc) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974) (pre-certification dispositive motion 
constituted an explicit waiver of the protection against one-way intervention; use of ―test case‖ prior 
to class certification ruling); Hyman v. First Union Corp., 982 F. Supp. 8, 11 (D.D.C. 1997) 
(discussing problem of one-way intervention and defendant‘s waiver by pre-certification summary 
judgment motion; concluding that defendants explicitly waived right); Issen v. GSC Enter., Inc., 
522 F. Supp. 390, 395 n.8 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (waiver of one-way intervention protection). 
 61. See, e.g., Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 513 F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir. 2008); Pisciotta v. Old 
Nat‘l Bancorp., 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007); Kehoe v. Fidelity Fed. Bank & Trust, 421 F.3d 1209, 
1211 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005) (―[I]t is within the court‘s discretion to consider the merits of the claims 
before their amenability to class certification‖); Estate of Gleiberman v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 94 
Fed. Appx. 944, 948 (3d Cir. 2004) (no abuse of discretion for the trial court to determine that the 
named plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted prior to determining 
class certification); Curtin v. United Airlines, Inc., 275 F.3d 88, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Schweizer v. 
Trans Union Corp., 136 F.3d 233, 238 (2d Cir. 1998); Cowen v. Bank United of Tex., FSB, 70 F.3d 
937, 941 (7th Cir. 1995) (Rule 23(c)(1) allowing for wriggle room for court to rule on pre-
certification summary judgment motion); Thompson v. County of Medina, Ohio, 29 F.3d 238, 241 
(6th Cir. 1994); Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 677 n.12 (10th Cir. 1988); Floyd v. Bowen, 833 
F.2d 529, 534-35 (5th Cir. 1987); Marx v. Centran Corp., 747 F.2d 1536, 1552 (6th Cir. 1984); Wall 
v. Leavitt, Medicare & Medicaid 302350, 2008 WL 744429 at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2008); Villagran v. 
Central Ford, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 2d 866, 882 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (a suit pleaded as a class action may 
be resolved by deciding a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment even before class 
certification is decided); Encarnacion ex rel. George v. Astrue, 491 F. Supp. 2d 453, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007) (district court may reserve decision on class certification motion pending disposition of 
summary judgment motion); Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 643, 647 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (district court may properly consider motion to dismiss prior to issue of class certification); 
Good v. Altria Group, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 446 (D. Me. 2005); Evans v. Taco Bell Corp., 2005 WL 
2333841, *4 n.6 (D.N.H. 2005) (―It is well-settled that, absent prejudice to the plaintiff, a court may 
decide a defendant‘s motion for summary judgment in a putative class action before taking up the 
issue of class certification‖); Coburn v. Daimler Chrysler Serv. of North America, L.L.C., 2005 WL 
736657, at *7 ((N.D. Ill. 2005) (―[P]recedent makes clear that the presence or potential presence of 
13
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that this is a preferred case management approach.
62
  Moreover, the 
argument that the Court‘s Eisen decision prevents a court from ruling on 
a pre-certification dispositive and summary judgment motions seems 
definitively to have been laid to rest: 
[The plaintiff] also relies on Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin . . . in which 
the Supreme Court held that it was inappropriate to make a preliminary 
assessment of the merits of a case in order to determine if it could be 
maintained as a class action.  Eisen makes clear that the determination 
of whether a class meets the requirements of Rule 23 must be 
performed separately from the determination of the merits, but it does 
not require the class certification to be addressed first.  ―There is 
nothing in Rule 23 which precludes a court from examining the merits 
of plaintiff‘s claims on a proper Rule 12 motion to dismiss or Rule 56 
motion for summary judgment simply because such a motion‖ 
precedes resolution of the issue of class certification.  Lorber v. Beebe, 
407 F. Supp. 279, 291 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).  See also Adames v. 
Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., 133 F.R.D. 82, 87 n.1 (E.D. N.Y. 1989).  The 
decision to award summary judgment before acting on class 
certification was well within the discretion of the district court, 
 
a class action does not alter a plaintiff‘s basic requirement of establishing all the elements of any 
cause of action alleged in a complaint‖); Garcia v. Veneman, 211 F.R.D. 15, 19 n.2 (D.D.C. 2002) 
(―A court may certainly decide dispositive motions prior to determining whether the case may be 
maintained as a class action‖); Allen v. Aronson Furniture Co., 971 F. Supp. 1259, 1261 (N.D. Ill. 
1997).  In 2007, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted a series of pre-
certification summary judgment motions, citing the same boilerplate endorsement of the court‘s 
discretion to issue such rulings.  See, e.g., Villigran v. Central Ford, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 2d 866, 882 
(S.D. Tex. 2007).  See also MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 53. (―It is well established that nothing in 
Rule 23 precludes a district court from exercising its discretion to address the merits of the putative 
class‘ claims on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or on a motion for summary 
judgment before addressing class certification.‖) (citing cases); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR 
R. MILLER, AND MARY KAY KANE, 7AA FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1785, 381 (3d ed. 2009) 
(―Under circumstances in which the merits of plaintiffs‘ claims can be readily resolved on summary 
judgment, defendant seeks an early disposition of those claims, and plaintiffs are not prejudiced as a 
result, a district court does not abuse its discretion by resolving the merits on summary judgment 
before considering the question of class certification.‖). 
 62. See, e.g., BRUNET & REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT § 10:16 (―A court should be vigilant 
in deciding a summary judgment motion before certifying a class to save litigants unnecessary 
expense and to economize on judicial time.  For these reasons, we encourage prompt judicial 
consideration of summary judgment motions in class actions‖); Rothstein, supra note 53;  MANUAL 
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH § 11.34 (Federal Judicial Center 2004) (―[S]ummary judgment 
is as appropriate in complex litigation as in routine cases‖); § 21.133 (―[M]ost courts agree, and 
Rule 23(c)(1)(A) reflects, that such pre-certification rulings on threshold dispositive motions are 
proper, and one study found a substantial rate of precertification rulings on motions to dismiss or for 
summary judgment.  Precertification rulings frequently dispose of all or part of the litigation.‖).  A 
minority of courts still look with disfavor on precertification summary judgment motions.  See, e.g., 
Quezada v. Loan Center of Cal., Inc., 2009 WL 3711970, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (―However, early 
resolution of a motion for summary judgment before class certification is often inappropriate . . . .‖). 
14
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particularly since [the plaintiff] never moved to certify the purported 
class.  See Christensen v. Kiewit-Murdock Inv. Corp., 815 F.2d 206, 
214 (2d Cir. 1987).
63
  
With the Eisen decision
64
 no longer a doctrinal barrier to pre-
certification consideration of summary judgment motions, courts have 
articulated general principles to guide district judges‘ discretion in 
considering such pre-certification summary judgment motions.  Courts 
agree that ruling on a dispositive motion prior to addressing class 
certification may be appropriate where there is sufficient doubt 
regarding the likelihood of success on the merits of the plaintiff‘s 
claims.
65
  It is likewise appropriate to rule on a summary judgment 
motion prior to class certification to prevent inefficiency
66
 or avoid 
waste,
67
 particularly the high transaction costs associated with class 
 
 63. Schweizer v. Trans Union Corp., 136 F.3d 233, 239 (2d Cir. 1998).  See also Adamson v. 
Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 677 n.12 (10th Cir. 1988) (in appropriate cases, a court may use accelerated 
summary judgment procedure before class certification to test the plaintiff‘s right to proceed to trial) 
(citing WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1785). 
 64. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
 65. See, e.g., Askew v. Holladay, 2009 WL 1767632 (E.D. Ark. 2009) (court may dismiss a 
case on its own motion if it determines that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted or by using an accelerated summary judgment procedure before class certification to 
test the plaintiffs‘ right to proceed to trial (citing Shook v. El Paso County, 386 F.3d 963, 974 (10th 
Cir. 2004)); Adamson, 855 F.2d at 677 n.12.  See also Cowen v. Bank United, 70 F.3d 937, 941 (7th 
Cir. 1995); Floyd v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 1987); Marx v. Centran Corp., 747 F.2d 
1536, 1552 (6th Cir. 1984); Goldsby v. Ford Motor Co., 183 F. Supp. 2d 943, 948-49 (D. Mich. 
2001) (if court determines plaintiff‘s claims are without merit, there is no harm in dismissing named 
plaintiff‘s case without explicitly deciding class certification issue); Thurmond v. Compaq 
Computer Corp., 171 F. Supp. 2d 667, 683 (D. Tex. 2001) (on defendant‘s summary judgment 
motion, a district court may examine the merits of the named plaintiffs‘ claims and dispose of those 
claims prior to class certification); Allen v. Aronson Furniture Corp., 971 F. Supp. 1259, 1261 (N.D. 
Ill. 1997); Trull v. Lason Sys., Inc., 982 F. Supp. 600, 603-04 (N.D. Ill. 1997).  But cf. Quezada v. 
Loan Center of Cal., Inc., 2009 WL 3711970, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (suggesting that pre-
certification summary judgment is often inappropriate because ―the relative merits of the underlying 
dispute are to have no impact upon the determination of the propriety of the class action,‖) (citing 
Thompson v. County of Medina, 29 F.3d 238, 241 (6th Cir. 1994); Marx v. Centran Corp., 747 F.2d 
1536, 1552 (6th Cir. 1984).  See also Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 630 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(―It is preferable to review a motion for class certification first [because] a quick disposition on the 
merits often is not possible.‖). 
 66. See, e.g., Cruz v. American Airlines, 150 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d on other 
grounds, 356 F.3d 320 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (resolution of cross-summary judgment motions might 
eliminate need for court to consider class certification motion; therefore, district court could 
consider summary judgment motions first in the interests of preserving judicial resources, as well as 
the resources of the litigants). 
 67. See, e.g., Marx v. Centran Corp., 747 F.2d 1536, 1552 (6th Cir. 1984) (―To require that 
notice be sent to all potential plaintiffs in a class action when the underlying claim is without merit 
is to promote inefficiency for its own sake‖).  At times a court may consider a proposed class action 
both meritless and wasteful.  See, e.g., Cavanaugh v. Humboldt County, 1999 WL 96017, at *2 
15
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litigation, such as providing notice
68
 or discovery.
69
  In addition, it is 
appropriate for a court to rule on summary judgment prior to class 
certification where neither the plaintiff nor members of the putative class 
would be prejudiced by the ruling.
70
 
C. Strategic Considerations Relating to Pre-Certification Summary 
Judgment 
As the Federal Judicial Center study documented, almost all pre-
certification summary judgment motions are filed by defendants.
71
  This 
fact comports with common sense because there would be little or no 
point for a plaintiff to file a putative class action, and then request a 
court to determine whether the plaintiff was entitled to a summary 
judgment.  Until the court certifies a class action, the litigation remains 
 
(N.D. Cal. 1999) (citing Wright v. Schock, 742 F.2d 541, 544 (9th Cir. 1984) (―It is reasonable to 
consider a Rule 56 motion [before class certification] when early resolution of a motion for 
summary judgment seems likely to protect the parties and the court from needless and costly further 
litigation.‖).  See also Christensen v. Kiewit-Murdock Inv. Corp., 815 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(district court had discretion to decide summary judgment motion before class certification motion 
to protect both the parties and the court from needless and costly further litigation); Quezada v. 
Loan Center of Cal., Inc., 2009 WL 3711970, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 06, 2009) (―[H]owever, early 
resolution of a motion for summary judgment before class certification often is inappropriate, and it 
is within the court‘s discretion to decide a summary judgment motion first where granting the 
motion ‗is likely to protect the parties and the court from needless further and costly litigation‘‖) 
(citing West v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 2006 WL 355214, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2006)). 
 68. See, e.g., Trull v. Lason Sys., Inc., 982 F. Supp. 600, 603-04 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (granting 
summary judgment prior to class certification is an appropriate procedure) (citing Marx v. Centran 
Corp., 747 F.2d 1536, 1552 (6th Cir. 1984) for proposition that ―[t]o require notice to be sent to all 
potential plaintiffs in a class action when the underlying claim is without merit is to promote 
inefficiency for its own sake.‖). 
 69. See, e.g., Good v. Altria Group, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 446 (D. Me. 2005) (stay of class action 
against tobacco company defendants warranted pending determination of defendants‘ summary 
judgment motion which could be dispositive and plaintiffs‘ pending motion for class certification 
could require extensive discovery). 
 70. See, e.g., Curtin v. United Airlines, Inc., 275 F.3d 88, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (―[W]here the 
merits of the plaintiffs‘ claims can be readily resolved on summary judgment, where the defendants 
seeks an early disposition of those claims, and where the plaintiffs are not prejudiced thereby, a 
district court does not abuse its discretion by resolving the merits before considering the question of 
class certification‖); Villagran v. Central Ford, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 866, 882 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (same); 
Coburn v. Daimler Chrysler Serv. North America, L.L.C., 2005 WL 736657, at *8 (N.D. Ill. 2005) 
(no unfairness in proceeding to adjudicate summary judgment prior to class certification based on 
numerous prior scheduling orders); Hyman v. First Union Corp., 982 F. Supp. 8, 11 (D.D.C. 1997) 
(deciding summary judgment motion before class certification motion because neither party would 
suffer significant prejudice, and it ―was more practicable to do so‖).  But cf. In re New Motor 
Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. 35, 40-41 (D. Me. 2005) (granting plaintiffs‘ 
motion to stay action on defendant General Motor‘s summary judgment motion; judge not 
sufficiently altered to defendant‘s desire for accelerated summary judgment). 
 71. See supra note 38. 
16
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an individual lawsuit against the defendant.  Thus, assuming a court 
granted a plaintiff‘s summary judgment prior to class certification, that 
ruling would only bind the named class representative, but not the 
putative class (which has yet to be certified).
72
 
Correlatively, it is fairly well-accepted that defendants, then, must 
make a strategic decision whether to seek a summary adjudication of a 
named plaintiff‘s claims, prior to class certification.73  Should the 
defendant prevail on a pre-certification motion, then the defendant gains 
a binding merits ruling only on the class representative‘s claims.74  The 
defendant does not gain a binding merits determination against the 
putative class, however.
75
  Instead, most courts that have considered 
summary judgment motions prior to class certification observe that if the 
court grants the defendant‘s summary judgment motion, then the class 
 
 72. This possibility raises the specter of one-way intervention, and waiver of the protection 
against one-way intervention, discussed supra at nn.57-58.  In theory a plaintiff could attempt, after 
a positive summary judgment ruling, to assert that ruling as collateral estoppels after class 
certification.  The author knows of no reported decision permitting offensive collateral estoppels of 
a plaintiff-favoring summary judgment ruling prior to class certification, asserted after class 
certification. 
 73. See generally BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 5, at § 10:16 (tactics regarding summary 
judgment and class actions; noting that because a trial order certifying a class action increases the 
settlement value of the case considerably, defense counsel should evaluate the potential filing of a 
motion for summary judgment before consideration of a class certification). 
 74. See Schwarzschild v. Tse, 69 F.3d 293, 297 (9th Cir. 1995) (―a decision rendered by the 
district court before a class that has been properly certified and notified is not binding on anyone but 
the named plaintiffs‖); Brotherson v. The Professional Basketball Club, L.L.C., 2009 WL 3286112 
(W.D. Wash. 2009) (order disposing of claims on summary judgment would not bind putative class 
members); Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d 
960, 974 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (dismissal prior to class certification is res judicata as to the class 
representatives, but has no effect on the putative class members); see generally JOSEPH M. 
MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3.3 (―Defendants should consider, however, 
that in moving to dismiss or for summary judgment prior to class certification, prevailing on the 
motion will provide them only with stare decisis protection rather than res judicata protection as to 
absent class members‖). 
 75. See Schwarzschild v. Tse, 69 F.3d 293, 297 (9th Cir. 1995); Wright v. Schock, 742 F.2d 
541, 543-44 (9th Cir. 1984) (―Where the defendant assumes the risk that summary judgment in his 
favor will have only stare decisis effect on members of the putative class, it is within the discretion 
of the district court to rule on the summary judgment motion first‖); Bush v. Rewald, 619 F. Supp. 
585, 600  (D. Haw. 1985). 
However, where defendants seek summary judgment knowing of the possibility that 
other plaintiffs will enter the case and not be bound thereby, and where defendants are 
willing to settle for the benefits of stare decisis rather than risk those of res judicata, it is 
not for the plaintiff or the court to deter them from assuming the risk. 
Id. (citing Wright, 742 F.2d at 541.  See also Roberts v. American Airlines, Inc., 526 F.2d 757, 762-
63 (7th Cir. 1975) (summary judgment against named plaintiffs would not protect defendants 
against other members of the class under doctrine of res judicata). 
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certification motion becomes moot.
76
  Unless another litigant or putative 
class member ―picks up the dropped spear,‖ the class litigation will 
effectively end.
77
 
Defendants, however, may not leverage a successful pre-
certification summary judgment motion―as against an individual named 
class representative―into a class-wide binding effect by seeking class 
certification after a court has dismissed the plaintiff‘s claims for lack of 
merit.
78
  On the contrary, defendants may obtain a class-wide preclusive 
effect if they successfully move for summary judgment on the merits of 
the class claims, after a court certifies a class.
79
  Judge Richard Posner, 
for the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, has aptly 
described the defendant‘s choices: 
Class actions are expensive to defend.  One way to try to knock one off 
at low cost is to seek summary judgment before the suit is certified as a 
class action.  A decision that the claim of the named plaintiffs lack 
merit ordinarily, though not invariably, disqualifies the named 
plaintiffs as proper class representatives.  The effect is to moot the 
 
 76. See, e.g., Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 539 F. 
Supp. 2d 960, 974 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (entry of summary judgment against class representatives‘ 
claims had effect of mooting motion for class certification); Beth V. by Yvonne V. v. Carroll, 876 
F. Supp. 1415, 1422 (D. Pa. 1995) (where defendant is entitled to summary judgment prior to class 
certification, court could dismiss motion for class certification as moot); Haas v. Boeing Co., 1992 
WL 221335, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1992) (granting defendant‘s summary judgment motion and 
denying class certification motion as moot); cf. Jibson v. Michigan Educ. Ass‘n-NEA, 30 F.3d 723, 
734 (6th Cir. 1994) (where district court properly determined that plaintiffs were not entitled to 
relief and granted summary judgment to defendant, court not required to rule on the motion for class 
certification). 
 77. Nothing, however, prevents another class representative from stepping forward to 
represent the class. 
 78. See Ortiz v. Lyon Mgmt. Group, Inc., 157 Cal. App. 4th 604, 620 (4th Dist. 2007) 
(―[D]efendant cannot cite a single case in which a defendant obtained class certification after first 
obtaining summary judgment against the named plaintiff‘s individual claim‖). But cf., Benfield v. 
Mocatta Metals Corp., 1993 WL 148978 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (―Thus, where, as here, a plaintiff‘s 
claims are dismissed prior to class certification, absent class members would be prejudiced if a court 
subsequently granted certification, and bound them to an adverse judgment‖).  See also Bieneman v. 
City of Chicago, 838 F.2d 962, 964 (7th Cir. 1988) (―[A] class representative who has lost on the 
merits may have a duty to the class to oppose certification, to avoid the preclusive effect of the 
judgment . . . .‖). 
 79. See, e.g., Dorfsman v. Law School Admission Council, Inc., 2001 WL 1754726, at *2 
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (―It is the actual certification of an action as a class action . . . which alone gives 
birth to ‗class as jurisprudential entity,‘ changes the action from a mere individual suit with class 
allegations into a true class action . . . and provides that sharp line of demarcation between an 
individual action seeking to become a class action and an actual class action‖); Robinson v. Sheriff 
of Cook County, 167 F.3d 1155, 1157 (7th Cir. 1999) (―The plaintiff‘s lawyer . . . would not be 
happy to have this case certified as a class action and then dismissed; that would have res judicata 
effect on any unnamed class members who did not opt-out‖). 
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question whether to certify the suit as a class action unless the lawyers 
for the class manage to find another representative.  They could not 
here because the ground upon which district court threw out the 
plaintiff‘s claims would apply equally to any other member of the 
class.  After granting the defendant‘s motion for summary judgment, 
therefore, and since (as was predictable, given the district judge‘s 
grounds) no one stepped forward to pick up the spear dropped by the 
named plaintiffs, the judge denied the motion for class certification. 
 When the procedure we just described is followed, the defendant loses 
the preclusive effect on subsequent suits against him if class 
certification but saves the added expense of defending a class action 
and may be content to oppose members of the class one by one, as it 
were, by moving for summary judgment, every time he is sued, before 
the judge presiding over the suit decides whether to certify it as a class 
action.
80
 
Whether to pursue summary judgment adjudication prior to class 
certification, then, chiefly embodies a defendant‘s kind of strategic 
Sophie‘s choice.  On the one hand, if a defendant assesses that a 
plaintiff‘s factual and legal allegations are fatally defective, the 
defendant has little to lose by pursuing summary judgment at that point.  
If the defendant pursues a summary judgment motion and prevails, the 
defendant assumes two possible negative risks: Either another plaintiff 
may pick up the class action spear, or alternatively the defendant will be 
subjected to successive rounds of repetitive litigation by individual class 
members pursuing individual claims. 
Anecdotal experience suggests, however, that when a defendant 
defeats a named class representative‘s claims through summary 
judgment prior to class certification, neither of the two downside risks 
occur.
81
  Thus, a prevailing defendant may be reasonably confident that 
 
 80. Cowen v. Bank United, 70 F.3d 937, 941-42 (7th Cir. 1995).  See also Postow v. OBA 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass‘n., 627 F.2d 1370, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (defendants, in moving for 
summary judgment prior to class certification, assume the risk that a judgment in their favor will not 
protect them from subsequent suits by other potential class members, ―for only the slim reed of 
stare decisis stands between them and the prospective onrush of litigants‖).  See also MCLAUGHLIN, 
supra note 53, at § 3:3 (―The sparse case law addressing whether a defendant may obtain 
certification of a plaintiff class after defendant has obtained a favorable ruling on the merits of the 
named plaintiff‘s individual claim holds that it cannot.‖). 
 81. The author knows of no empirical data documenting the extent to which plaintiffs that 
suffer a defeat at summary judgment, prior to class certification, are replaced by another class 
representative who then successfully pursues the class litigation.  In addition, the author knows of 
no empirical study documenting the incidence of subsequent, repetitive individual litigation after a 
named class representative‘s claims have been dismissed prior to class certification.  From 
conversation with defense counsel over approximately twenty years, defense counsel report that 
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another class representative will not step up to pursue the class litigation, 
nor will successive plaintiffs renew individual litigation against the 
defendant based on the allegations dismissed by summary judgment.  
Moreover, if a defendant prevails on summary judgment prior to class 
certification, this merits-based determination tends to lessen the 
enthusiasm of counsel to pursue further individual or class litigation, 
unless counsel can remedy the pleading defects and be confident to 
survive a stare decisis ruling in subsequent litigation. 
On the other hand, when presented with a factually and legally 
deficient class action case, some defense attorneys strategically prefer to 
allow the class to be certified,
82
 and then move for summary judgment in 
order to gain a class-wide preclusive effect of the summary judgment 
ruling.  Again, based on anecdotal evidence, defense attorneys elect this 
option less often, because pursuing this strategy involves transaction 
costs, such as certification discovery and extensive certification motions 
practice that could otherwise be avoided by a pre-certification summary 
judgment motion.  In addition, seeking summary judgment after class 
certification entails the added risk that the court might not grant the 
defendant‘s summary judgment, which would place the defendant in a 
weakened bargaining position, facing the prospect of class trial, 
additional transaction costs, and a forced settlement. 
It should be noted, however, that defense counsel routinely motions 
for summary judgment after class certification, even where it is not 
abundantly certain that the plaintiff‘s allegations are fatally defective.  
And, in some instances, courts may receive cross-motions for summary 
judgment by both plaintiffs and defendants after class certification.  If 
the court grants either parties‘ motion, the plaintiff or defendant gains 
the class-wide preclusive effect of the court‘s ruling.  Indeed, some 
courts may prefer to defer ruling on the summary judgment motion until 
after class certification, precisely to provide such a class-wide preclusive 
effect to its ruling. 
Notwithstanding that summary judgment is available to the litigants 
after class certification (which provides the additional benefit of class-
wide preclusion), there are powerful arguments in support of the thesis 
that deciding summary judgment prior to class certification is a preferred 
approach to handling complex class action litigation.  The historical 
 
they rarely, if ever, face additional litigation if they prevail on a pre-certification summary judgment 
motion. 
 82. In situations where defense counsel is convinced that the plaintiff‘s case is fatally 
defective, some defense counsel elect not to oppose class certification.  This is a highly unusual 
situation in class action practice, but it does occur. 
20
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resistance to pre-certification summary judgment in the class action 
context has eroded considerably over time, as the realities of the 
transaction costs of complex litigation have become manifest.  
Transaction costs for class litigation in the digital age have grown 
exponentially.  In addition, recent pleading jurisprudence, as well as 
class certification standards, reflects the judiciary‘s growing concern 
with liberal notice pleading and easy class certification, in light of the in 
terrorem effect of class certification.  As discussed below, these trends 
are now coalescing to buttress the argument in favor of enhanced or 
mandatory summary judgment prior to class certification. 
III.  CLASS ACTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE  
POST-TWOMBLY/IQBAL ERA 
As indicated above, in the early 1990s when the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules was considering various reforms to Rule 23, 
one proposal would have codified a provision explicitly permitting 
judges to rule on dispositive Rule 12 or Rule 56 motions prior to ruling 
on class certification motions.
83
  The Advisory Committee abandoned 
this proposed amendment after 1995. 
In the ensuing fifteen years, federal courts have undergone a sea-
change in attitudes towards civil litigation generally, and complex 
litigation specifically.  Four trends are noteworthy and bear on 
consideration of the role of summary judgment in class action litigation.  
First, the Supreme Court has retreated from the norm of liberal notice 
pleading and instead articulated a regime of heightened pleading 
requirements.
84
  Second, federal appellate courts have now clarified the 
―rigorous analysis‖ standard for class certification, in effect endorsing 
heightened class certification requirements.
85
  Third, prominent 
academics have, in various formulations, urged that courts utilize some 
form of merit-based analysis in connection with class certification.
86
  
Finally, the debate over pre-certification discovery converges with these 
trends to support the argument for enhanced summary judgment practice 
prior to class certification. 
Each of these trends is discussed in the following sections.  More 
importantly, each of these trends―and the convergence of these 
trends―support the argument for enhanced summary judgment practice 
 
 83. See supra note 22. 
 84. See supra notes 11-12. 
 85. See supra note 13. 
 86. See supra note 14. 
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prior to class certification.  Requiring summary adjudication prior to 
class certification is consistent with these trends and, as argued below, 
embodies a preferable procedural approach to resolving the several 
problems that have animated these developing trends. 
A. The Heightened Pleading Trend 
Perhaps the most revolutionary development in federal practice in 
the past five years has been the Supreme Court‘s retrenchment in Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
87
 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
88
 of the liberal notice 
pleading regime embodied in Conley v. Gibson
89
 and its progeny.
90
  
Significantly for the conversation concerning summary judgment 
practice in complex litigation, both Twombly
91
 and Iqbal
92
 are grounded 
in fairness and efficiency rationales, including in Twombly the in 
terrorem effect of complex litigation on defendants to settle. 
 
 87. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).  The Twombly and Iqbal decisions have generated a substantial body 
of academic and practitioner commentary.  See generally Damon Amyx, The Toll of Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly: An Argument for Taking the Edge Off the Advantage Given Defendants, 33 VT. 
L. REV. 323 (2008); Janice R. Ballard, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: Has the Court Re-Set the Bar 
With a Heightened Pleading Standard?, 32 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 183 (2008); Bone, Twombly, 
supra note 11, at 873.; Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading 
Standards, and Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431 (2008); Hannon, Note, supra 
note 11; Harvey Kurzweil, Eamon O‘Kelly, & Susannah P. Torpey, Twombly: Another Swing of the 
Pleading Pendulum, 9 SEDONA CONF. J. 115 (2008); Smith, supra note 11; A. Benjamin Spencer, 
Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2009); Spencer, supra note 11; Michelle 
Spiegel, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Question of a Heightened Standard of Pleading in Qualified 
Immunity Cases, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUBLIC POL‘Y SIDEBAR 375 (2009); Paul Stancil, 
Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90 (2009); Pleading Standards, 123 HARV. 
L. REV. 252 (2009); J. Douglas Richards, Symposium, The Future of Pleading in the Federal 
System: Debating the Impact of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 82 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 849 (2008). 
 88. 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 89. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 90. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 511-12 (2002) (rejecting heightened 
pleading requirement in employment discrimination civil rights litigation; upholding liberal 
pleading requirements under FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (a)(2)); Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 507 U.S. 163, 
164 (1993) (federal courts may not apply more stringent pleading standard in civil rights cases 
alleging municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).  In dissent in Twombly, Justices Stevens and 
Ginsburg noted that Conley‘s ―no set of facts‖ language had been cited by the Supreme Court in 
dozens of the Court‘s opinions.  ―In not one of those sixteen opinions was the language 
‗questioned,‘ ‗criticized,‘ or ‗explained away.‘  Indeed, today‘s opinion is the first by any Member 
of this Court to express any doubt as to the adequacy of the Conley formulation.‖  See Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 571, 577 n.4 (J. Stevens and Ginsburg, dissenting) (citing cases in which Court endorsed 
the Conley liberal pleading standard). 
 91. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 92. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
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Twombly
93
 involved an antitrust class action brought on behalf of 
local telephone service subscribers against major telephone companies, 
alleging violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
94
  The 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant telephone companies had engaged in 
parallel, conspiratorial conduct to inhibit the growth of local phone 
companies, and to eliminate competition in territories where any one 
company was dominant.
95
  The federal district court dismissed the 
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted 
under Rule 12(b)(6),
96
 but the United States Court of Appeals reversed, 
holding that the district court had applied the incorrect pleading 
standard.
97
  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question 
concerning the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy 
through allegations of parallel conduct.
98
 
The Supreme Court reversed.
99
  In considering the proper pleading 
standard under Rule 8(a)(2),
100
 the Court revisited standards developed 
pursuant to the Court‘s landmark Conley101 decision.  The Court 
concluded that while a complaint that is challenged by a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff has an 
obligation to provide the grounds for entitlement to relief, which 
requires ―more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of 
the elements of a cause of action.‖102 
In order to withstand a threshold Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, 
the Court set forth a pleading standard of reasonable plausibility in 
support of the claim, constituting an entitlement to relief.
103
  Pursuant to 
this standard, a pleader‘s factual allegations must be enough to raise a 
right to relief above the speculation level.
104
  The Court cautiously 
 
 93. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 94. 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 95. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 96. 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 97. 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 98. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553. 
 99. Id. 
 100. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), which requires that a pleader set forth only ―a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.‖ 
 101. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 102. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id., 550 U.S. at 556.  Applying the standard to the plaintiff‘s Section 1 Sherman Act 
antirust allegations, the Court held that: 
[S]tating such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to 
suggest an agreement was made.  Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement 
does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for 
enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of 
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indicated that it did not require heightened pleading of specifics, ―but 
only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.‖105 
In the context of the Twombly litigation, the Court‘s plausibility 
standard for pleading antitrust allegations was largely grounded in the 
Court‘s appreciation of the substantial transaction costs―especially 
discovery costs―entailed in complex antitrust litigation.106  The Court 
noted: ―Thus, it is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an antitrust 
complaint in advance of discovery . . . but quite another to forget that 
proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive.‖107  The Court also 
was not sanguine that groundless cases could be ―weeded out‖ by careful 
case management techniques early in the discovery process,
108
 or that 
case management techniques would suffice to curb discovery abuses in 
dubious, complex cases.
109
  Furthermore, the Court linked problems 
relating to discovery abuse with the potential in terrorem settlement 
pressure placed upon defendants, especially in complex cases: 
 
illegal agreement. 
Id. 
 105. Id., 550 U.S. at 570.  The Court held that: ―Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged 
their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.‖  Id. 
 106. Id. at 558. 
 107. Id.  The Court added: ―As we indicated over 20 years ago . . . , ‗a district court must retain 
the power to insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual 
controversy to proceed.‘‖ 
In forceful language, dissenting Justices Stevens and Ginsburg rejected the majority‘s central 
policy rationale for its heightened pleading standard: 
The transparent policy concern that drives the decision is the interest in protecting 
antitrust defendants―who in this case are some of the wealthiest corporations in our 
economy―from the burdens of pretrial discovery . . . Even if it were not apparent that 
the legal fees petitioners have incurred in arguing the merits of their Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion have far exceeded the cost of limited discovery, or that those discovery costs 
would burden the respondents as well as petitioners, that concern would not provide an 
adequate justification for this law-changing decision.  For in the final analysis it is only 
lack of confidence in the ability of trial judges to control discovery, buttressed by 
appellate judges‘ independent appraisal of the plausibility of profoundly serious factual 
allegations, that could account for this stark break from precedent. 
Id. at 596-97 (J. Stevens and J. Ginsburg, dissenting). 
 108. Id. at 559. 
 109. Id.  Dissenting Justices Stevens and Ginsburg contended that the majority‘s practical 
concerns in antitrust litigation did not merit ―the court‘s dramatic departure from settled procedural 
law.‖  See id. at 573.  The dissenters argued that the majority‘s practical concerns merited careful 
case management, strict discovery control, careful scrutiny of evidence at summary judgment, and 
lucid instructions to the jury, but they these concerns did not justify the dismissal of an adequately 
pleaded complaint without even requiring the defendants to file answers denying the charges that 
they had engaged in collective decision-making.  Id. at 572-73. 
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And it is self-evident that the problem of discovery abuse cannot be 
solved by ―careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary judgment 
stage,‖ much less ―lucid instructions to juries‖; . . . the threat of 
discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even 
anemic cases before reaching those proceedings.
110
 
More broadly, the Court in Twombly interred any conflicting 
pleading standards derived from Conley’s famous ―no set of facts‖ 
language.
111
  The Court suggested that, after ―puzzling the profession for 
50 years,‖ the prevailing Conley standard was ―best forgotten as an 
incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a 
claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any 
set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.‖112  The 
Conley language did not, in the Court‘s view, provide a minimum 
standard of adequate pleading to govern a complaint‘s survival.113 
In Iqbal,
114
 the Supreme Court laid to rest the question whether 
Twombly’s plausibility pleading standard applied beyond the antitrust 
context.  Iqbal involved the claims of a Pakistani Muslim detained by 
federal authorities after the September 11th terrorist attacks.
115
  Iqbal 
alleged that he was deprived of various constitutional protections while 
he was in federal custody and that he was subjected to harsh conditions 
of confinement by virtue of his race, religion, or national origin.
116
  He 
sued various federal officials, including the former Attorney General of 
the United States and the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.
117
 
The defendants raised the defense of qualified immunity from suit 
and moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
118
  Both the district 
court and appellate court rejected the defendant‘s motion to dismiss, 
concluding the plaintiff‘s complaint was sufficient to state a claim 
despite the defendant‘s official status.119 
 
 110. Id. at 559 (internal citations omitted). 
 111. Id. at 562-63. 
 112. Id. at 563. 
 113. Id. 
 114. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 115. Id. at 1942. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
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The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Iqbal‘s pleadings were 
insufficient.
120
  Relying on Twombly, the Court held that although the 
Rule 8 pleading standard did not require detailed factual allegations, ―it 
demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 
accusation.‖121  The Court reaffirmed two working principles from 
Twombly: (1) the tenet that a court must accept as true all allegations 
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions,
122
 and (2) 
only a claim that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to 
dismiss.
123
  Applying these principles to the allegations in Iqbal‘s 
complaint, the Court held that the plaintiff‘s bare assertions, much like 
the pleading of conspiracy in Twombly, amounted to nothing more than a 
formulaic recitation of the elements of a constitutional discrimination 
claim.  As such, the allegations were conclusory and not entitled to be 
assumed true: ―It is the conclusory nature of the respondent‘s 
allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, that 
disentitles them to the presumption of truth.‖124 
The Court in Iqbal elaborated on three crucial pleading points.  
First, the Court held that its plausibility standard announced in Twombly 
was not limited to antitrust cases.  Instead, the Court stated that the 
Court‘s decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for all 
civil actions and that it applied to antitrust and discrimination cases 
alike.
125
  Second, the Court held that the question presented by a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss―challenging the legal sufficiency of 
pleading allegations――does not turn on controls that a district court 
might place on the discovery process.‖126  In Iqbal, then, the Court again 
 
 120. Id. at 1942-43.  Four Justices dissented, and would have held that Iqbal‘s complaint 
satisfied Rule 8(a)(2).  The dissenters argued that the fallacy of the majority‘s position was in 
looking at the plaintiff‘s relevant assertions in isolation.  See id. at 1954-61 (J. Souter, Stevens, 
Ginsburg and Breyer, dissenting). 
 121. Id. at 1949. 
 122. Id.  The Court held that: 
[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 
statements, do not suffice . . . Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the 
hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of 
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. 
Id. 
 123. Id. at 1950.  ―But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than 
the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged―but it has not ‗show[n]‘ that the 
‗pleader is entitled to relief.‖ 
 124. Id. at 1951. 
 125. Id. at 1953. 
 126. Id.  The Court indicated that its rejection of the careful case management approach was 
especially important in suits where government official defendants are entitled to assert the defense 
of qualified immunity.  ―The basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials from 
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rejected the argument that careful case management could temper the 
burdens imposed by allowing a legally deficient complaint to proceed.
127
  
Third, the Court held that ―the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
require courts to credit a complaint‘s conclusory statement without 
reference to it factual context.‖128 
Taken together, the Court‘s decisions in Twombly129 and Iqbal130 
represent a ratcheting-up of pleading standards in federal court.  
Twombly involved underlying class action litigation;
131
 Iqbal did not.
132
  
Although technically eschewing the language of ―heightened pleading,‖ 
the Court in both cases effectively created more substantial pleading 
burdens to withstand dismissal at the pleading stage.  
The Court‘s rationales supporting enhanced pleading standards in 
both cases reflect the Court‘s concerns with the realities of modern civil 
litigation.  In Twombly, the Court justified more stringent review of 
pleading allegations in light of the substantial transaction costs generated 
by discovery in complex litigation, coupled with the in terrorem effect 
of such litigation on the defendant‘s willingness to settle.133  Hence, the 
Court coupled an efficiency rationale with a fairness concern.
134
  And, 
although Iqbal did not involve class litigation, the Court expressed 
similar concern for the disruptive and burdensome effect of the litigation 
process on governmental officials―most notably discovery.135  
Moreover, in both cases the Court reiterated its skepticism that careful 
case management techniques could serve to temper transaction costs, 
burdensome intrusions, or litigation fairness.
136
 
 
the concerns of litigation, including ‗the avoidance of disruptive discovery.‘‖  Id.  In dissent, Justice 
Breyer argued that the litigants had not presented sufficient evidence to show that careful case 
management techniques could not be fashioned to protect the defendants from burdensome 
intrusions.  Justice Breyer suggested, consistent with the Second Circuit‘s decision, that a trial court 
―can structure discovery in ways that diminish the risk of imposing unwarranted burdens on public 
officials.‖  See id. at 1961-62 (J. Breyer, dissenting). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 1954. 
 129. 550 U.S. 544. 
 130. 129 S. Ct. at 1937. 
 131. 550 U.S. at 544. 
 132. 129 S. Ct. at 1937. 
 133. See 550 U.S. at 544. 
 134. Id. 
 135. 129 S. Ct. at 1937. 
 136. 550 U.S. 544 (2007); 129 S. Ct. at 1937 
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B. Heightened Class Certification Standards  
The trend towards requiring greater specificity and plausibility in 
pleading civil cases has been paralleled in recent years by a similar 
appellate trend requiring heightened class certification standards.
137
  In a 
series of appellate decisions, federal courts have ratcheted-up the 
standards of production and proof in satisfaction of class certification.
138
  
Moreover, the rationales underlying the articulation of these heightened 
class certification standards accord with the rationales supporting 
heightened pleading standards: fairness and efficiency. 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has offered perhaps the clearest 
articulation of heightened class certification standards in its 2008 
decision of In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation.
139
  In what 
may be the most influential decision relating to class certification since 
the Supreme Court decided Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
140
 the Third 
Circuit issued a sweeping opinion articulating standards of proof likely 
to have a tremendous impact on all class litigation.
141
  The Hydrogen 
Peroxide decision carries significant weight because Chief Judge 
Anthony Scirica, the opinion‘s author, has served as the Chair of the 
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, on the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, and Chair of the Judicial 
Conference Working Group on Mass Torts.
142
 
Since 1982, federal courts routinely have recited that class 
certification is proper only ―if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous 
analysis, that the prerequisites‖ of Rule 23 are met.143  In Hydrogen 
Peroxide, Judge Scirica insightfully noted that extant class certification 
jurisprudence provided federal courts with little guidance on the proper 
standard of proof in implementing this rigorous analysis language.
144
  
Hence, the Third Circuit stepped into this breach and articulated 
standards of proof district courts should apply at class certification.
145
  
These standards, consistent with emerging heightened pleading 
 
 137. See supra note 13. 
 138. See supra note 13. 
 139. 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 140. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 141. 552 F.3d at 305. 
 142. In 2008, Chief Justice Roberts named Judge Scirica as Chair of the Executive Committee 
of the Judicial Conference.  Over his lengthy career, Judge Scirica has been extensively involved 
with reform of Federal Rule 23. 
 143. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). 
 144. In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 315-16. 
 145. Id. 
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jurisprudence, reflected a growing concern with lax application of class 
certification standards. 
The Third Circuit clarified three key aspects of class certification 
procedure that heightened judicial obligations and the burdens of 
production and persuasion by the proponents seeking class certification.  
First, a district court must make findings that all Rule 23 requirements 
are met, and may not certify a class action based merely upon a 
―threshold showing‖ by the party seeking certification.146  Second, a 
district court must resolve all factual or legal disputes relevant to 
certification, even if that determination overlaps with merits-based 
questions intertwined with the underlying claims.
147
  And third, a district 
court must consider all conflicting expert testimony.
148
 
The Hydrogen Peroxide litigation involved an antitrust class action 
by direct purchasers of hydrogen peroxide and related chemicals against 
chemical manufacturers.
149
  The plaintiffs brought the action under § 4 
of the Clayton Act, alleging a conspiracy in restraint of trade violating § 
1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
150
  After extensive discovery and a 
certification hearing including conflicting expert testimony, the district 
court certified the class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
151
  The 
defendants sought interlocutory appeal contending that the class 
certification failed to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)‘s predominance 
requirement.
152
  The defendants argued that the court erred in (1) 
applying too lenient a standard of proof, (2) failing to meaningfully 
consider the defense expert‘s views while crediting the plaintiff‘s 
experts, and (3) applying a presumption of antitrust impact under 
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp.
153
  The Third Circuit agreed, and remanded 
the case for further review.
154
 
Historically, antitrust actions have been among the easiest to certify 
because courts have found conspiracy allegations sufficient to bootstrap 
class-wide findings of predominance required by Rule 23(b)(3).  The 
Hydrogen Peroxide decision, then, marked a significant departure for the 
undemanding class certification of antitrust cases.
155
  However, 
 
 146. Id. at 316. 
 147. Id. at 316 - 17. 
 148. Id. at 323. 
 149. Id. 
 150. 15 U.S.C. §1; 552 F.3d at 308. 
 151. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 240 F.R.D. 163, 167 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 152. 552 F.3d at 309. 
 153. Id. at 312; 561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1977).  
 154. In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 327. 
 155. See id. 
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notwithstanding the antitrust context of its rulings, the Third Circuit was 
emphatic that the clarified standards of proof articulated in its decision 
applied to all substantive class actions, not just antitrust actions.
156
  The 
Third Circuit announced that the district court had erred in applying too 
lenient a standard of proof with respect to Rule 23 requirements and that 
courts may no longer accept a mere ―threshold showing‖ by plaintiffs.157  
Thus, the Third Circuit set forth clarified standards of proof to guide 
class certification analysis in all future proposed class actions. 
First, Rule 23 class certification requirements are not mere pleading 
requirements.  Courts may delve beyond the pleadings to determine if 
class certification requirements are met, and courts must make findings 
that each Rule 23 requirement is satisfied.
158
  ―Factual determinations 
necessary to make Rule 23 findings must be made by a preponderance of 
the evidence.
159
  In other words, to certify a class the district court must 
find the evidence more likely than not establishes each fact necessary to 
meet the requirements of Rule 23.‖160  The evidence and arguments a 
court considers in evaluating the suitability of a proposed class for 
certification also requires rigorous analysis.  Importantly, a party‘s mere 
assurance that it intends or plans to meet certification requirements in 
the future is insufficient.
161
 
Second, a court must resolve disputed issues raised at class 
certification: 
Under these Rule 23 standards, a district court exercising proper 
discretion in deciding whether to certify a class will resolve factual 
disputes by a preponderance of the evidence and make findings that 
each Rule 23 requirement is met or is not met, having considered all 
the relevant evidence and arguments presented by the parties.
162
 
Third, a court may not decline to resolve relevant certification 
disputes because there may be an overlap between the certification 
requirement and an underlying merits issue.
163
  The Court stated that this 
evaluation does not violate the Eisen rule.
164
  Hence, a court‘s rigorous 
 
 156. Id. at 321-22. 
 157. Id. at 321. 
 158. Id. at 320. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 321. 
 162. Id. at 320. 
 163. Id. at 316-17. 
 164. Id. (citing Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154 (7th Cir. 
2001) and Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974)). 
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analysis may include preliminary inquiry into the merits; a court may 
consider the substantive elements of the case to envision how an actual 
trial would proceed.
165
 
Fourth, expert opinion testimony requires rigorous analysis and 
should not be uncritically accepted as establishing a Rule 23 
requirement, merely because the court holds that the testimony should 
not be excluded.
166
  Weighing conflicting expert testimony may be 
integral to a rigorous analysis of Rule 23.
167
  In the underlying litigation, 
the district court erroneously gave weight only to the plaintiff‘s expert 
testimony that class-wide impact could plausibly be demonstrated by 
two possible methodologies, while not crediting conflicting defense 
expert testimony that those methodologies were incorrect and 
unworkable.
168
 
Judge Scirica partially drew authority for the Court‘s conclusions 
based on Rule 23 amendments that became effective in 2003.  Rule 
23(c)(1)(A) was amended to change the timing of class certification, to 
encourage discovery into certification requirements, and to avoid 
premature certification decisions.
169
  The 2003 amended Advisory 
Committee Note introduced the concept of a trial plan, to focus judicial 
attention on a rigorous analysis of a likely trial on the merits.
170
  The 
2003 amendments eliminated conditional class certification.  The 
Standing Committee advised that conditional class certification was 
deleted to avoid suggestion that certification could be granted on a 
tentative basis, even if it was unclear that Rule 23 requirements were 
satisfied.
171
 
The Third Circuit also addressed various formulaic standards the 
Court indicated will no longer suffice to permit class certification.  
Generally, the Court repudiated any mechanical language that might 
signify that the plaintiff‘s burden at class certification was lenient.172  
The Court indicated that it was incorrect that a plaintiff need only 
demonstrate an ―intention‖ to try the case in a manner that satisfies the 
predominance requirement.  Consequently, courts misapply Rule 23 if 
 
 165. In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 316-17. 
 166. Id. at 323. 
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. at 325. 
 169. Id. at 318-320. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH, supra note 8. 
 170. In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 319. 
 171. Id. at 319-20. 
 172. Id. at 322. 
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they find a plaintiff need only make a ―threshold showing‖ of 
certification requirements.
173
  Emphatically, the Court instructed: 
A ―threshold showing‖ could signify, incorrectly, that the burden on 
the party seeking certification is a lenient one (such as a prima facie 
showing or a burden of production) or that the party seeking 
certification receives deference or a presumption in its favor.  So 
defined, ―threshold showing‖ is an inadequate and improper 
standard.
174
 
In antitrust class actions, the Court repudiated the notion that in 
horizontal price-fixing conspiracy cases courts, when in doubt, may 
apply a presumption favoring class certification. The Third Circuit 
concluded that such presumptions ―invite error.‖175  Moreover, the Court 
rejected the notion that certification-favoring presumptions can relieve 
district courts of their obligations to conduct a rigorous analysis in any 
type of class action.  ―Although the trial court has discretion to grant or 
deny class certification, the court should not suppress ‗doubt‘ as to 
whether a Rule 23 requirement is met—no matter what the area of 
substantive law.‖176 
Finally, the Third Circuit addressed the Supreme Court‘s famous 
suggestion in Amchem, that the Rule 23(b)(3) ―predominance test is 
readily met in certain cases alleging securities fraud  or violations of the 
antitrust laws.‖177  Acknowledging this, the Third Circuit instead 
contended that ―it does not follow that a court should relax its 
certification analysis, or presume a certification requirement is met, 
merely because a plaintiff‘s claims fall within one of those substantive 
categories.‖178 
The Third Circuit also drew support for its clarification of 
certification standards from the parallel universe of heightened pleading 
cases, most notably Twombly.
179
  The Court recognized the relevance of 
those pleading decisions for heightened scrutiny at the point of class 
certification, and for similar rationales relating to fairness and 
 
 173. Id. at 321. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 321-22. 
 177. Id. (citing Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997)). 
 178. In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 322. 
 179. Id. at 310. The Hydrogen Peroxide appeal was decide before the Supreme Court decision 
in Iqbal. 
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efficiency.
180
  Indeed, much of the court‘s analysis surrounding the class 
certification process resonates in similar analysis in Twombly.
181
 
The Hydrogen Peroxide decision sets forth a lengthy exposition of 
class certification jurisprudence, the rigorous analysis standard, and the 
rationales justifying heightened scrutiny of class certification 
requirements.
182
  The Third Circuit‘s exposition joins other federal 
appellate circuits that―within the last five years―similarly have 
embraced more stringent merit-based evaluations of class certification 
requirements.
183
  The general thrust of these decisions, collectively, 
requires a more careful, calibrated examination of whether a proposed 
class action may proceed, and eschews facile class certification. 
C. Academic Commentary and the Merits-Evaluation Trend 
The trend among federal courts in articulating heightened pleading 
standards and rigorous class certification standards has been paralleled 
by a trend in academic commentary over the last decade urging federal 
courts to adopt some form of merit-based analysis in the class action 
context.
184
  Almost all this commentary is grounded in similar rationales: 
that complex class litigation ought not to proceed until a court takes a 
meaningful ―peek‖ at the merits, in the interests of efficiency and 
fairness.  This commentary is grounded in the recognition that complex 
litigation is unlike ordinary or bipolar litigation,
185
 that class action 
litigation entails substantial transactional and reputational costs and 
 
 180. But proper discretion does not soften the rule: a class may not be certified without a 
finding that each Rule 23 requirement is met.  Careful application of Rule 23 accords with the 
pivotal status of class certification in large-scale litigation, because ―denying or granting class 
certification is often the defining moment in class actions (for it may sound the ―death knell‖ of the 
litigation on the part of plaintiffs, or create unwarranted pressure to settle non-meritorious claims on 
the part of defendants). . . .‖  Newton, 259 F.3d 154 at 162.  See id. at 167 (―Irrespective of the 
merits, certification decisions may have a decisive effect on litigation.‖); see also Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978).  In some cases, class certification ―may force a 
defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class action and run the risk of 
potentially ruinous liability.‖  FED. R. CIV. P. 23 Advisory Committee's Note, 1998 Amendments.  
Accordingly, the potential for unwarranted settlement pressure ―is a factor we weigh in our 
certification calculus.‖  Newton, 259 F.3d at 168 n.8.  The Supreme Court recently cautioned that 
certain antitrust class actions may present prime opportunities for plaintiffs to exert pressure upon 
defendants to settle weak claims.  See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 181. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 182. See 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 183. See supra note 13. 
 184. See supra note 14. 
 185. See, e.g,, Hazard, supra note 14, at 2  (noting that the valuation of claims in ordinary 
litigation is more easily accomplished than in class action litigation; valuation of class claims is 
more difficult for four enumerated reasons). 
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litigation burdens,
186
 and that class action litigation―at the point of class 
certification―asserts inertial pressure on defendants to settle the 
litigation.
187
  Moreover, this commentary is grounded in the premise that 
at least some class action litigation is frivolous or legally deficient, and 
ought not to proceed or to be settled.
188
  The rationales underlying the 
academic proposals for merits-based class certification parallel the 
reasoning underlying the decisions in Twombly,
189
 Iqbal,
190
 and the 
Hydrogen Peroxide
191
 line of cases. 
The emergence of academic commentary suggesting merits-based 
analysis is noteworthy because of the longstanding jurisprudential 
barrier presented by the so-called Eisen rule, which historically has been 
urged as prohibiting any merits-based analysis at the class certification 
stage.
192
  Generally, plaintiffs especially resisted any judicial scrutiny of 
the underlying merits of their class allegations, preferring the settlement 
leverage gained through uncritical class certification.  Defendants, on the 
other hand, have urged courts to apply a rigorous analysis standard at 
class certification that would permit courts to probe beyond the 
pleadings to evaluate whether the asserted claims and defenses―in 
relation to the underlying law―may be pursued in the class action 
format.
193
  In both instances, plaintiffs and defendants alike have 
invoked the Eisen rule in support of their contentions.  Against the 
 
 186. See Bone & Evans, supra note 14, at 1286-1319 (analyzing error-cost factors in class 
certification decisions). 
 187. See generally McGuire, supra note 14, at 370-76  (discussing the impact of class 
certification and the benefits of a preliminary assessment of the merits of the underlying claims); 
Bone & Evans, supra note 14, at 1286-1319; Hazard, supra note 185, at 10 (discussing problem of 
settlement blackmail).  See also In the Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(same). 
 188. See generally Kozel & Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 1849  (recognizing the existence of 
frivolous class actions that are settled for their nuisance value only); Bone & Evans, supra note 14, 
at 1328  (―A preliminary screening of the merits in all class actions will help deter frivolous suits by 
controlling abuse of the settlement leverage certification creates.‖). 
 189. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 190. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 191. 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 192. McGuire, 168 F.R.D. at 376-80 (1996) (discussing the Eisen rule). 
 193. See Hazard, supra note 14, at 2.  Professor Geoffrey Hazard has correctly characterized 
this debate as a contest of heated political rhetoric: 
The contending dies often seem to be talking about very different transactions.  On 
behalf of votaries for claimants, it is asserted that wholesale rip-offs are involved, in 
which defendants have unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of unprotected 
ordinary citizens.  On behalf of defendants, it is alleged that the class suit itself is 
blackmail.  Of course, much of this talk is simply the shield-banging media rhetoric that 
has become all too customary an accompaniment to litigation involving high stakes. 
Id. 
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backdrop of this considerable Eisen kerfuffle, scholars have converged 
on the thesis that Eisen does not present a jurisprudential bar to merit-
based considerations during the class certification process.
194
 
For example, Professor Geoffrey Hazard has proposed that the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules ought to consider procedures for 
determining the merits of individual claims and the size of the class 
before the suit is certified as a class suit.  ―The basic idea,‖ he writes, ―is 
to reverse the decision in Eisen v. Carlyle & Jacquelin and to provide for 
an initial judgment on the merits of class members in relation to the 
claims.‖195  Moreover, Professor Hazard has noted that ―there is nothing 
inherent in a class suit that would prevent a determination of merits of 
some of the claims before addressing the problem of class certification;‖ 
that is, that the Eisen decision presents no such obstacle.
196
 
Professor Hazard‘s proposal entails amendments to Rule 23 that 
would permit a court conditionally to certify a class, conduct pretrial 
discovery with respect to the scope and scale of a limited subset of 
typical claims, and try those claims to establish typical values.  If the 
plaintiff prevailed, the court would revoke the conditional certification 
and certify the entire class; if the defendant prevailed, the court would 
decertify the class.
197
 
Professors Robert G. Bone and David S. Evans have proposed a 
root-and-branch approach to the Eisen doctrine, suggesting that it ought 
to be abolished.
198
  These commentators suggest that courts should 
assess the class certification requirements (for numerosity, commonality, 
typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority)
199
 based on 
evidence, including a merits-evaluation of the certification requirements 
and a showing of likelihood of success on the merits of each 
requirement.
200
  This approach is preferable, its authors argue, to courts 
attempting to screen deficient merits-based class litigation through strict 
pleading standards or penalties for frivolous filings.
201
 
The Bone-Evans proposal to require judges to conduct a merits-
based analysis of class certification requirements is based on cost-benefit 
policy rationales: 
 
 194. Cf. Bone & Evans, supra note 14, at 1251 (urging abolition of the Eisen rule). 
 195. Hazard, supra note 14, at 4. 
 196. Id. at 9. 
 197. Id. at 4-6. 
 198. Bone & Evans, supra note 14, at 1264-76. 
 199. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 
 200. Bone & Evans, supra note 14, at 1327-30. They characterize their proposal as ―modest.‖  
Id. at 1327. 
 201. Id. at 1328. 
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Rule 23 calls for a ―rigorous analysis‖ of each class certification 
requirement.  Moreover, as we have seen, some of those requirements, 
such as commonality, typicality, predominance and superiority, call on 
the court to predict the likely litigation path of the lawsuit, and this 
kind of prediction often requires an evaluation of the strength of the 
issues on the facts of the case.  The Eisen rule, in effect, imposes an 
independent constraint on the scope of the certification inquiry in the 
name of avoiding prejudice, maintaining procedural purity, reducing 
errors, and conserving litigation resources.  Such a constraint might be 
an acceptable gloss on Rule 23 if its purported benefits were clear and 
substantial enough.  But they are not. 
 Our policy arguments also have broader implications.  The error-and-
process-cost analysis supports our more ambitious proposal that judges 
conduct a merits review as part of every certification decision 
regardless of whether merits-related issues are directly relevant to a 
certification requirement.  Limited precertification discovery would be 
allowed on all the salient issues in the case, and the trial judge would 
make and justify a determination whether class members‘ substantive 
claims have a significant likelihood of success.  The merits inquiry 
need not be elaborate or extensive.  The goal would be to avoid 
certifying class actions when the class claims are all substantively 
frivolous or extremely weak.
202
 
Professor Geoffrey P. Miller is the third prominent academic to 
contribute to the merits-based class certification debate,
203
 and he too has 
endorsed some version of a merits-based inquiry at class certification.
204
  
In parsing the Eisen decision, Professor Miller has contributed a useful 
schema of Eisen interpretations that courts have applied in construing 
this problematic decision.  Thus, Professor Miller explains that some 
courts pursuant to Eisen have adopted ―strong-form‖ rules that prohibit 
the court from inquiring into the merits of the claims and require courts 
instead to accept as true the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint.
205
  
Other courts have adopted ―weak-form‖ rules that permit a court to 
make reasonable inquiries into the merits relevant to class certification 
requirements.
206
  In a third variation, a few courts have adopted ―super-
weak‖ rules that either permit or require a court to evaluate the class‘s 
likelihood of success in the litigation.
207
 
 
 202. Id. at 1327-28. 
 203. See generally Miller, supra note 14, at 51. 
 204. Id. at 84-87. 
 205. Id. at 55-59. 
 206. Id. at 59-62. 
 207. Id. at 62. 
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Professor Miller argues that both strong-form and super-weak form 
rules have little foundation in the law and are not supported by the Eisen 
decision.
208
  Professor Miller instead endorses the weak-form merits 
rule, which he states is ―easy to justify under existing law.‖  A court that 
applies the weak-form rule ―is simply engaged in the normal and 
expected judicial task of marshalling relevant evidence and applying law 
to facts.  In fact, any reasonable interpretation of Rule 23 mandates a 
weak-form rule, since the framers of the rule must have intended to 
equip trial courts with the resources to make an informed and reasoned 
decision.‖209 
Similar to other academic commentators, Professor Miller supports 
his merits-based rule preference based on relevant underlying social 
policy rationales: the intersection of merits evaluation with preclusion 
doctrine, the effects of merits evaluation on the relative settlement 
posture of plaintiffs and defendants, and judicial economy concerns.  In 
these arenas, Professor Miller argues that the weak-form merits rule 
comports with preclusion concerns (the problem of one-way 
intervention),
210
 and ―offer a better mix of settlement effects than either 
of the alternatives.‖211  Regarding judicial efficiency, Professor Miller 
concedes that the efficiency of weak-form merits rule is more 
ambiguous, because weak-form rules are more burdensome at the front 
end of litigation than strong-form rules.  Nonetheless, Miller concludes 
that:  
Preliminary inquiries under a weak-form rule might have the 
efficiency-enhancing effects to the extent that they focus the trial 
court‘s attention on the case at any early point in the litigation and 
induce better trial and pretrial management.  Preliminary merits rulings 
under weak-form rules may also facilitate earlier settlements . . . . 
212
 
Finally, Professor David Rosenberg and Randy J. Kozel have 
suggested one of the most interesting merits-evaluation proposals.
213
  
These commentators have proposed that courts engage in mandatory 
summary judgment adjudication on class claims as a pre-requisite to 
final approval of any settlement agreement.
214
  The authors view the 
mandatory summary judgment process as a means to overcome the 
 
 208. Id. at 63-64. 
 209. Id. at 64. 
 210. Id. at 69-78. 
 211. Id. at 78-82. 
 212. Id. at 83-84. 
 213. See Kozel & Rosenberg, supra note 14. 
 214. Id. at 1853, 1860. 
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nuisance-settlement problem in class action litigation.
215
  According to 
Kozel and Rosenberg, some percentage of meritless class litigation is 
nonetheless pursued because ―paying off the proponent of the meritless 
claim or defense rather than incurring the greater expense of litigating to 
have it dismissed may well be the opponent‘s rational (and expected) 
course of action.‖216 
Again, social policy rationales are offered in support of the 
mandatory summary judgment model.  Nuisance class action suits, it is 
argued, ―decrease social welfare by vexing and taxing the victimized 
party, encouraging misallocation of legal resources, and diminishing 
public confidence in the civil liability system.‖217  Moreover, the 
prospect of nuisance settlements distorts the incentives of potential 
litigants to take socially appropriate levels of precaution against risk.  
Therefore, ―mandating summary judgment as a condition precedent to 
entering into an enforceable settlement agreement eliminates the 
potential payoff from nuisance-value strategies, removing any incentive 
to employ them.‖218 
The authors‘ model for mandatory summary judgment, they 
explain, is simple.  Class claims would have to be submitted for merits 
review on summary judgment as the precondition for the parties to enter 
into an enforceable class settlement.
219
  This procedure, they contend, 
would not add significant costs, as compared to the costs of settling non-
nuisance class actions.
220
  The mandatory summary judgment model, 
however, contemplates that such a merits-based review would occur 
after class certification, rather than prior to class certification.
221
  Kozel 
and Rosenberg contend that pre-certification merits review provides 
minimal advantages that are ―overshadowed by prohibitive costs.‖222  
Therefore, these commentators argue that mandatory summary 
 
 215. Id. at 1850.  ―The civil justice system is rife with situations in which the difference in cost 
between filing and ousting meritless claims or defenses makes the nuisance-value strategy 
profitable.‖  Id. at 1851. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 1852. 
 218. Id. at 1853. 
 219. Id. at 1861-62. 
 220. Id. at 1871-72.  This is because, the authors contend, current standards for judicial 
approval of class settlements entail far more extensive expenditures and substantive analyses to 
evaluate the merits of the class claims, relative to the showing that would be required for mandatory 
summary judgment. 
 221. Id. at 1890-93. 
 222. Id. at 1893-94; 1896-1901. 
38
Akron Law Review, Vol. 43 [2010], Iss. 4, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol43/iss4/5
10_MULLENIX_WESTERN 11/9/2010  1:15 PM 
2010] DROPPING THE SPEAR 1235 
judgment, if fully effective, is far more efficient than pre-certification 
merits review as a means of preventing nuisance-value claims.
223
 
Collectively, academic commentary by influential scholars within 
the last decade manifests a trend towards endorsing some sort of merits 
review during the class certification process.
224
  These proposals share 
common ground in the fundamental policy reasons supporting such 
merits-based scrutiny of class claims.  This academic commentary is 
consistent and convergent with the growing trends in federal decisional 
law that requires more specificity and plausibility in pleading and more 
rigorous analysis of class certification motions.  While varying in detail 
and degree, the academic proposals urge courts to assess the underlying 
merits of class claims, or class certification requirements, during the 
process of certifying a class action.  Somewhat separately, Kozel and 
Rosenberg would require a regime of mandatory summary judgment 
adjudication after class certification but prior to settlement authorization. 
Hence, the academic universe has moved a considerable distance 
from eschewing merits-based evaluations in the class action context.  
But, having conceptually embraced the thesis that some merits 
evaluation in complex litigation is appropriate―if not necessary―the 
most logical, efficient, and fair approach is to require summary judgment 
adjudication prior to class certification on the individual plaintiff‘s 
claims.  All current proposals are wrongheaded in this: merits-evaluation 
during the class certification comes too late to avoid substantial 
transaction costs, judicial inefficiency, and fairness concerns. 
In a post-Hydrogen Peroxide world,
225
 the class certification 
process has become increasingly burdensome and costly under 
heightened ―rigorous analysis‖ requirements.  Thus, proceeding with the 
class certification process entails massive transaction costs involved with 
pre-certification discovery and motion practice. 
Pre-certification summary judgment adjudication, in effect, avoids 
the class certification process altogether if the defendant prevails on the 
motion and the plaintiff has filed a legally and factually insufficient 
complaint.  Assuming that a plaintiff‘s complaint survives a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the availability of pre-certification summary 
judgment permits discovery limited to the named plaintiff‘s 
claim―which constitutes a cabined investigation and a contained cost.  
 
 223. Id. at 1892-93. 
 224. See id. at 1891 (―Though its validity as a purely judicial creation remains questionable in 
the federal system, PCMR [pre-certification merits review] has been gaining support in recent years 
from influential commentators and federal appellate courts alike.‖) (citing authorities and cases). 
 225. 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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If the plaintiff‘s claims cannot withstand a summary adjudication, the 
plaintiff should not be able to gain an aggregation advantage by allowing 
class certification without a ruling on the summary judgment motion.  It 
is simply unfair and inefficient to postpone merits evaluation until the 
class certification hearing or some other post-certification opportunity 
(such as a precondition to settlement authorization). 
D. The Pre-Certification Discovery Debate 
A rule requiring pre-certification summary judgment adjudication 
in advance of class certification also ameliorates problems relating to the 
nature and scope of pre-certification discovery.  The extent to which 
parties to a class action litigation should be able to gain access to 
discovery prior to class certification, as well as the scope of that 
discovery, has become a heated and controversial debate. 
Generally, prior to the class certification decision, plaintiffs seek 
expansive general discovery into the class claims,
226
 including discovery 
relating to the merits of the class claims.
227
  Defendants, on the contrary, 
seek to cabin discovery as much as possible―to limit the ability of 
plaintiffs to conduct a fishing expedition into the defendants‘ records 
and practices.  Defendants also seek to cabin discovery because of the 
substantial transaction costs involved in responding to plaintiff‘s 
expansive merits-based discovery requests.  Hence, most defendants 
seek to limit pre-certification discovery only to information relating to 
satisfaction of class certification requirements, rather than wholesale 
merits discovery on class members‘ claims.228 
Courts have taken different approaches to authorizing or limiting 
discovery before the class certification motion.  There is some authority 
for the proposition that if it is evident from the nature of the claims 
pleaded and applicable law that the record is adequate for a court to 
decide whether a class may be certified, a court may decline to order 
pre-certification discovery to either party.
229
  In the post-Hydrogen-
 
 226. See, e.g., American Nurses‘ Ass‘n v. Illinois, 1986 WL 10382, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 1986) 
(plaintiffs seek general discovery on merits issues underlying employment discrimination claims). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id.; See, e.g., Borskey v. Medtronics, Inc., 1998 WL 122602, at *3 (E.D. La. 1998) 
(―Therefore, before the Court fully releases the hounds of discovery to flush out the entire spectrum 
of possible plaintiffs, the Court finds it prudent to focus the spotlight on those criteria that the 
named plaintiffs allegedly possess.‖). 
 229. See, e.g., Fogie v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 1398 (D. Minn. 1993).  Accord, THE 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH, supra note 8, at §21.14  (―A threshold question is 
whether precertification discovery is needed.  Discovery may not be necessary when claims for 
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Peroxide
230
 class certification era, it seems increasingly unlikely that 
many courts will certify class actions based on the facial sufficiency of 
the pleadings alone. 
In most class action litigation, the question whether a proposed 
class action is suitable for certification is a contested issue.  Hence, when 
the facts relevant to class certification are disputed, or when the party 
opposing class certification contends that the claims or defenses raise 
individualized issues, most courts recognize that some discovery may be 
necessary.
231
  The nature and scope of permissible discovery prior to 
class certification typically is contended by the parties. 
In this situation, courts often bifurcate discovery between 
certification issues and merits issues underlying the class allegations,
232
 
in order to balance the competing needs of and burdens on the parties.
233
  
However, a judicial order bifurcating discovery often leads to contention 
among the parties concerning the characterization of discovery requests; 
in many instances, it is not always clear what information has bearing on 
class certification issues only, as opposed to underlying merits concerns.  
The Federal Judicial Center and federal courts have recognized that there 
is not always a bright line between discovery limited to certification 
issues only, and merits discovery on the underlying claims.
234
  
Moreover, the Judicial Center has suggested that some pre-certification 
discovery into the merits of the claims is generally more appropriate for 
complex cases that are likely to continue even if the litigation is not 
certified as a class action.
235
 
 
relief rest on readily available and undisputed facts or raise only issues of law (such as a challenge 
to the legality of a statute or regulation.)‖). 
 230. 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 231. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH, supra note 8, at §21.14.  It is generally 
improper for a court to dismiss a proposed class action, without any precertification discovery, if the 
pleadings do not conclusively establish that the Rule 23 requirements are met.  See Walker v. World 
Tire Corp., 563 F.2d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 1977). 
 232. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH, supra note 8. 
 233. See, e.g., Nat‘l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 88 F.R.D. 272 (D. Conn. 
1980) (balancing the needs of plaintiffs and defendants for precertification discovery, and limiting 
discovery of both parties). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
Allowing some merits discovery during the precertification period is generally more 
appropriate for cases that are large and likely to continue even if not certified.  On the 
other hand, in cases that are unlikely to continue if not certified, discovery into aspects of 
the merits unrelated to certification delays the certification decision and can create 
extraordinary and unnecessary expense and burden.  If merits discovery is stayed during 
the precertification period, the judge should provide for lifting the stay after deciding the 
certification motion. 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH, supra note 8. 
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Requiring a court to evaluate and adjudicate pre-certification 
summary judgment motions effectively would address the related 
problem of permissible pre-certification discovery.  In this regard, the 
prevailing approach―that recommends bifurcation of discovery between 
class certification evidence and merits evidence―has it backwards.  This 
approach is inefficient, contentious, and often difficult to apply.  Thus, 
rather than limiting pre-certification discovery to information related to 
the satisfaction of class certification requirements, pre-certification 
discovery should be limited to merits discovery of the plaintiff‘s claims 
that is necessary to support or oppose a summary judgment motion. 
Limiting discovery to the underlying merits of the plaintiff‘s claims 
prior to class certification satisfies various social policy goals.  It is both 
efficient and fair.  First, cabining merits discovery prior to class 
certification limits the exposure of both parties to the substantial 
transaction costs entailed in wholesale discovery of class claims.  If a 
plaintiff‘s complaint is legally and factually deficient, there is scant 
justification to expose a defendant to wholesale class-wide merits 
discovery before class certification. 
Further, if the defendant prevails on the pre-certification summary 
judgment motion, limited merits discovery prior to class certification 
eliminates the transaction costs entailed in certification discovery, as 
well as the related costs of litigating the class certification motion.  
Limiting discovery to the merits of the plaintiff‘s claims, for the 
purposes of a summary judgment motion, also avoids the contentious 
debates concerning what discovery requests relate to certification issues 
only, and what discovery requests bear on underlying merits issues. 
Limited merits discovery prior to class certification also benefits 
the named plaintiffs.  To the extent that a plaintiff may have lacked 
factual or evidentiary support for his or her claims at the time of filing 
the class complaint, limited merits discovery prior to class certification 
permits the plaintiff to develop its case and to avoid summary judgment 
dismissal.  Indeed, such limited merits discovery―provided the plaintiff 
has legally and factually viable claims―may enhance the class litigation 
itself if the plaintiff is able to withstand the defendant‘s summary 
judgment motion prior to class certification.  Without regard to the 
suitability of the action to class certification, a prevailing plaintiff that 
withstands pre-certification summary judgment has the advantage of 
learning that a court believes the action is viable enough to proceed to 
trial. 
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IV.  SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN MDL PROCEEDINGS 
A. The Non-Class Action Aggregation Movement 
This article has largely focused on the role of summary judgment, 
prior to class certification, as a means for efficiently and fairly 
adjudicating complex litigation.  Although class action litigation 
undoubtedly will remain a procedural fixture for resolving large-scale 
disputes, other non-class aggregation methods for addressing complex 
litigation exist and may become a primary means for resolving such 
cases.  Thus, the Federal Judicial Center has studied the expanding role 
of multidistrict consolidation in federal civil litigation,
236
 and it has 
documented an increasing trend among federal courts to utilize this 
procedural mechanism.
237
 
The multidistrict litigation statute provides for the transfer of cases 
from various federal district courts to a single, designated MDL court, 
for consolidated and coordinated pre-trial proceedings.
238
  The FJC has 
documented an increasing trend of the Panel of Multidistrict Litigation 
to grant MDL status to major litigation and to order MDL transfers.
239
  
The FJC study has found that the Panel is more likely to order MDL 
transfer if the proceeding includes class allegations.
240
  In addition, the 
study finds that a substantial percentage of class action litigation 
transferred under MDL auspices is terminated during the MDL pretrial 
process.
241
 
In analyzing this trend towards increased use of MDL proceedings, 
the FJC has concluded that this trend partially is the result of the 
increased difficulty in obtaining class certification, especially in mass 
 
 236. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (the ―Multidistrict Litigation‖ statute; otherwise known as MDL 
proceedings).  See generally, Symposium, The Problem of Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 
2199 (2008). 
 237. See Emery G. Lee, Margaret Williams, Richard A. Nagareda, Joe S. Cecil, Thomas E. 
Willging, & Kevin M. Scott, The Expanding Role of Multidistrict Consolidation in Federal Civil 
Litigation (Draft paper, Federal Judicial Center 2009); see also Deborah R. Hensler, The Role of 
Multi-Districting in Mass Tort Litigation: An Empirical Investigation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 883 
(2001) (documenting increasing numbers of MDL proceedings). 
 238. See supra note 237. 
 239. Lee, Williams, Nagareda, Cecil, Willging, & Scott, supra note 237, at 2, 9. 
 240. Id. at 2-3, 9-10. 
The study found that the MDL panel is more likely to order MDL transfer in proceedings 
raising claims relating to air disasters, antitrust, intellectual property, and securities 
issues.  The study also found that the overwhelming majority of MDL cases were 
products liability cases, and that asbestos cases made up a substantial part of the whole. 
Id. at 2-3. 
 241. Id. at 24. 
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tort litigation.
242
  Hence, MDL proceedings have become a surrogate 
means for aggregating litigation and at the same time avoiding the rigors 
(and possible rejection) of the class action rule.  Thus, the FJC has 
concluded: 
Details aside, the big-picture emerges: Courts are very unlikely to 
certify class actions for the litigation of mass torts.  Still, the practical 
need to avoid duplicative discovery and other inefficiencies of pretrial 
litigation remains for the parties on both sides, counsel, and the courts.  
The observed inclination toward a higher grant rate for MDL motions 
in products liability cases thus can be understood as a partial substitute 
for litigation inefficiencies now unavailable via class certification.  
From the standpoint of defendants, MDL transfer makes for greater 
efficiencies in pretrial process without the additional pressure to settle 
that arises from the increased variance in the potential outcome 
associated with class certification.
243
 
Whether defendants prefer MDL transfer and consolidated 
proceedings―because these proceedings avert the settlement pressure 
concomitant with potential class certification―remains an open question 
and is an inquiry outside the scope of this article.  One might be 
skeptical of this proposition, however, because class certification is 
available in MDL proceedings, thereby diluting the theory that MDL 
proceedings circumvent the class action rule in some way.
244
 
For the purposes of this discussion, however, attention should be 
paid to MDL forum proceedings, assuming there is a documented trend 
towards resolving complex litigation under MDL auspices.  If this is 
true, then the locus of inquiry should be on the role of pre-trial motions 
in MDL proceedings as a means to resolve complex litigation (parallel to 
the role of dispositive pre-certification motions in class action litigation).  
If some substantial percentage of MDL litigation involves class action 
litigation, then the argument for pre-certification summary adjudication 
is the same for MDL proceedings. 
Defendants should, in appropriate MDL cases, seek summary 
judgment of the named plaintiffs‘ claims, and MDL judges should 
resolve such motions prior to deciding a class certification motion.  
 
 242. Id. at 21. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Having suggested that MDL proceedings are both desirable and favorable to defendants 
because these proceedings are a surrogate for class action litigation, the FJC study nonetheless notes 
a high correlation between grants of MDL motions and the presence of a request for class 
certification.  The FJC study suggests that ―the connection between MDL treatment and requests for 
class certification also reflects other practical effects that bear close attention.‖  Id. at 22. 
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Concededly, resolving summary judgment motions may become 
complicated where an MDL proceeding has consolidated multiple, 
competing class actions. Nonetheless, summary judgment prior to a class 
certification decision is an efficient and fair means for resolving 
complex litigation in an MDL proceeding, just as it would be in a single 
district court proceeding.  The form of the proceeding (MDL) ought not 
to alter the soundness of the principle that summary adjudication of an 
individual plaintiff‘s claim ought to precede class certification. 
B. Dispositive Motion in MDL Procedure 
Finally, it should be noted that MDL judges clearly have the power 
to rule on dispositive motions to dismiss and on motions for summary 
judgment.
245
  The FJC has noted that the MDL process effectively 
centralizes the application of various means for pretrial scrutiny.
246
  
Hence, the FJC has suggested that: ―Interpretation and application of the 
Twombly pleading standard, the Court‘s summary judgment trilogy, and 
the Daubert admissibility standard understandably are not identical 
across the federal system.  MDL treatment for pretrial proceedings, 
however, effectively operates to lend a unitary yardstick for the making 
of such rulings.‖247 
Thus, whether complex litigation is pursued under class action 
auspices in a single federal court or through a consolidated MDL 
proceeding, litigants are authorized to pursue dispositive motions and 
judges are authorized to resolve such motions.  The desirability of such 
procedure seems manifest; the only question concerns the extent to 
which judges ought to be required to rule on such motions.  This article 
urges that the federal rules make explicit a requirement that federal 
judges evaluate and rule on summary judgment prior to creating a large, 
aggregate litigation, either through class certification or through some 
other non-class aggregate procedure. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
More than fifteen years ago, proponents suggested an amendment 
to Rule 23 that specifically would have given federal judges discretion to 
rule on dispositive Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 motions prior to class 
 
 245. See David F. Herr, MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION MANUAL: PRACTICE BEFORE THE 
JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION § 9:21 (2009) (citing cases); see also Lee, et al., 
The Expanding Role of Multidistrict Consolidation, supra note 237, at 26 n.98. 
 246. Lee, Williams, Nagareda, Cecil, Willging, & Scott, supra note 237, at 26. 
 247. Id. 
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certification.
248
  In the firestorm of heated emotions surrounding the 
Amchem
249
 and Ortiz
250
 settlement classes―then working their way 
through the federal appellate system―this proposed amendment was 
abandoned along with many other Rule 23 proposed amendments.  The 
proposal for pre-certification review of dispositive motions was attacked 
as an illegitimate incursion on the Eisen doctrine; the plaintiffs‘ bar 
especially viewed this proposal as constituting a prohibited judicial 
venture into assessing the merits of claims in the class action context. 
That was then, and this is now.  In hindsight, the proposed 
amendment relating to pre-certification dispositive motions seems 
entirely innocuous; the proposal was not mandatory and merely would 
have given judges explicit authorization to decide pre-certification 
dispositive motions, where Rule 23 does not on its face provide such 
judicial guidance.  Moreover, the Eisen argument seems entirely to be a 
red herring.  Judicial consideration of pre-certification dispositive 
motions on the named class representative‘s claims have nothing at all to 
do with the Eisen rule, and any number of federal courts have 
consistently pointed this out. 
As this article has suggested, codifying a provision that explicitly 
authorizes federal judges to rule on pre-certification summary judgment 
motions has a great deal to recommend it.  Such a provision would be 
congruent with and parallel to trends in heightened pleading and 
heightened class certification requirements, as well as commentary by 
influential legal scholars that merits examination in the class action 
context is not only permissible, but desirable.  As is true of most rule 
amendments, promulgating a provision with regard to pre-certification 
dispositive motions―at this point―would consist of little more than 
codification of existing practice.  Many federal courts, it seems, have 
abandoned any historical resistance to reviewing and granting pre-
certification dispositive motions. 
The need for a rule amendment now is essentially the same as in the 
early 1990s, when advocates first suggested this proposal.  Although 
judges already have discretion to rule on dispositive motions prior to 
class certification, many do not exercise this discretion.  Admittedly, we 
do not have good empirical evidence―actually, any empirical 
evidence―concerning why judges decline to rule on pre-certification 
dispositive motions.  Some judges, at least, are chary to rule on 
 
 248. See supra note 22. 
 249. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 250. 157 Cal. App. 4th 604. 
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dispositive motions in absence of clear authorization in Rule 23.  Other 
judges may eschew ruling on pre-certification dispositive motions based 
on some pre-conceived notion that a court must rule on class 
certification prior to ruling on any dispositive motions.  Some judges 
may decline ruling on pre-certification motions in the misguided or 
mistaken belief that such procedure is prohibited by the Eisen rule.  
Finally, some judges may defer ruling on a pre-certification summary 
judgment rule, based on the historical premise that complex cases are 
almost never suitable for summary judgment disposition. 
A rule amendment specifically authorizing consideration of pre-
certification dispositive motions would provide federal judges with a 
rule-based text upon which to proceed.  A weak-form version of such an 
amendment would replicate the discretionary language in the 1993 and 
1995 proposals; a strong-form version of such an amendment would 
require judges to rule on dispositive motions and not defer consideration 
until after class certification.  The Advisory Committee Note to this 
provision could indicate that the provision was a codification of existing 
law, that pre-certification consideration of dispositive motions did not 
violate the Eisen rule, and that best practices entailed deciding pre-
certification motions in a timely fashion.  A provision authorizing or 
mandating judicial ruling on pre-certification dispositive motions could 
be located either in Rule 23, Rule 12, Rule 56, or in some combination 
of the rules. 
The focus of this article and proposal has been on pre-certification 
summary judgment practice, rather than the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss.  Critics of the Court‘s Twombly251 decision have suggested that 
the plausibility pleading standard visits a harsh and unfair consequence 
on plaintiffs, prior to discovery.  In a similar vein, critics of the 
Hydrogen Peroxide
252
 line of cases, requiring heightened proof to satisfy 
the rigorous analysis test for class certification, have assailed this 
ratcheting-up of the class certification standards, with its concomitant 
cost and expense. 
Enhanced summary judgment practice prior to class certification, 
then, represents an intermediate position between dismissing a case as 
facially deficient on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but avoiding the transaction 
costs and fairness concerns associated with meeting the heightened class 
certification requirements for class certification.  In focusing pretrial 
practice on summary judgment, this provides more leniency at the 
 
 251. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 252. 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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pleading threshold, but it affords plaintiffs the opportunity for limited 
merits discovery on the pre-certification summary judgment motion.  As 
explained above, pre-certification summary judgment practice, with 
discovery limited to the merits of the plaintiff‘s individual claims, strikes 
a sensible and fair accommodation to the pre-certification discovery 
dilemma.  
However, it should be noted that this proposal for enhanced 
summary judgment prior to class certification might require differential 
or more careful application, depending on the substantive nature of the 
type of class litigation pursued. The need for a ruling on summary 
judgment prior to class certification may be most compelling in Rule 
23(b)(3) damage class action context. On the other hand, summary 
judgment before class certification might be less compelling in the 
context of Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive or declaratory class actions, where 
the remedy is classwide. Similarly, certain types of class actions ― such 
as antitrust or Title VII pattern-and-practice class actions ― that depend 
on inherently classwide proof, also might not be suitable for pre-
certification summary judgment adjudication. 
Finally, the case for enhanced pre-certification summary judgment 
practice entails modification of the still-prevailing mindset that summary 
judgment is not suitable in complex cases.  This proposition seems ill-
conceived and outmoded; complexity itself provides no basis for a free 
pass to class certification or settlement.  Given the realities of modern 
class litigation and the substantial costs, expenses, and judicial resources 
involved in resolving such litigation, the informal presumption ought to 
be the reverse of the historical view.  Hence, complex litigation ought to 
be viewed as especially suitable for summary judgment adjudication, 
given the size and complexity of the stakes involved. 
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